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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a sense of ddj& vu to the vision of a uniform body of
state procedural law applicable in every state court throughout the
nation. Swift v. Tysons' dream of a nationally uniform body of state
substantive common law 2 that mirrored an evolving body of uniform
federal common law never materialized because state courts refused to
3
defer to federal common law, which was applied only in federal court.
Swift itself was overturned in 1938 by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins4 that federal courts must defer to the
substantive lawmaking authority of state courts. But almost
simultaneously with the demise of Swift, the dream of uniform state
common law was reincarnated into a vision of uniform state
procedural law through the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act
(REA) and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1.
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
2.
FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.36 (5th ed. 2001) ("The rule in Swift v.
Tyson might have formed the basis for pervasive expansion of federally formulated decisional
law. If the state courts had deferred to federal court decisional law, a nationally uniform common
law might have developed as it did in Canada.")
3.
Id. ("As it happened, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was extended to many matters that
seemed 'purely local,' but the rules involved were applied only in federal court." (citing PAUL M.
BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 694-702 (2d ed. 1973))).
4.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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The Federal Rules prescribed a uniform code of federal
procedure applicable in every federal district court, replacing the
hodgepodge of federal practice that had developed under the
Conformity Act of 1872. 5 Inter-federal district court uniformity was
premised on the ideal that "any lawyer could go to any federal court,
and be secure that she could understand and master the procedure
6
required, since that procedure would be at once uniform and simple."
Just as Justice Story had hoped that state courts would defer to an
evolving and enlightened body of uniform federal decisional law, so too
did the proponents of the REA expect the states to follow the uniform
body of procedural law embodied in the Federal Rules. 7 They hoped to
produce intrastate procedural uniformity8 and reverse the prior
federal court practice under the Conformity Act of following local state
procedure.
As states replicated the federal rules, interstate
procedural uniformity throughout state courts would result. 9
During the first thirty years after their adoption, the Federal
Rules realized the drafters' goal of inter-federal district procedural
uniformity. 10 And, until the mid-1970s,1 1 it seemed that the goal of

5.
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46
MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) ("[The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938]
represented a triumph of uniformity over localism.").
6.
Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2018 (1989).
7.
See, e.g., Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the ExaggeratedRole of Rules: A
Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 320 (2001) (noting the expectation behind the Rules
Enabling Act that "the Federal Rules would be so enlightened and simple that intra-state
uniformity would follow naturally as states voluntarily adopted the federal model."); Subrin,
supra note 6, at 2026 ("To those who advocated federal rules, intrastate uniformity was to result
from the modeling by state supreme courts of state procedure on federal.").
8.
The term "intra-state uniformity" is employed in this article to mean "identical formal
(or textual) rules for federal and state courts." Main, supra note 7, at 320. Professor Main notes
that intra-state uniformity has also been used to connote uniformity among federal district
courts within a given state. Id. at 324; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural
Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49
ALA. L. REV. 79, 80 (1997) ("I use intrastate uniformity to describe a state's having the same civil
procedural rules in both its state courts and in the federal district courts that are housed within
the state.")
9.
See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 274 (1989) ("The concept of uniformity among federal district courts,
between federal and state courts, and among the states represents a variation on the idea of
simplicity."). But see Subrin, supra note 6, at 2007-08 (noting Senator Thomas Walsh's opposition
to uniform federal rules: "[Walsh] believed it was unlikely ... that all states would agree to
follow a new set of federal rules. Conditions around the country varied and different regions
needed different procedures.").
10. See Subrin, supra note 8, at 80 ("By inter-federal district court uniformity, I mean
national procedural uniformity across all federal district courts."); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 551-52:

20051

NEW FEDERALISM IN STATE CIVIL JUSTICE

1171

interstate procedural uniformity would be achieved from the top down
as a lengthening list of states adopted the federal rules. 12 The words
of one commentator reflected this optimism: "The drafters of the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hoped to establish those rules as a
model that the states could adopt, thus fostering national and
13
intrastate procedural uniformity."'
Despite this early trend, however, the vision of interstate
procedural uniformity has not materialized for two reasons. First, the
uniformity of the federal rules has fragmented with the proliferation
14
of local court rules, resulting in a balkanization of federal procedure.
The Advisory Committee and the federal judiciary were able to maintain the
fundamental procedural tenets [underlying the rules] during the first three decades
after the 1938 federal rules' adoption ....The judges also preserved and fostered
uniformity by prescribing comparatively few local procedures, especially strictures
that were inconsistent with the federal rules of acts of Congress.
11. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
358-59 (2002/2003):
[Aifter a nearly constant rate of state-court replication of the FRCP from 1949 to
1975, a twenty-six-year period in which the number of replica jurisdictions rose from
four to twenty-three, in the ensuing ten years from 1975 to 1985 not a single new
state had joined the ranks of federal replicas ... [and] the pace of state court
procedural reform stopping short of replication but, nonetheless, moving state
procedure substantially closer to the federal model had also slackened almost to a halt
during 1975-1985.
12. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts,
45 DUKE L.J. 929, 937 (1996) ("State courts and legislatures in most states soon perceived [the
benefits of federal discovery] and replicated the federal practice in their state courts."); Seymour
Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 602 (2002) ("State procedure rules soon followed the federal model as a
majority of the states adopted the main features of the new federal procedure."); Thomas Wall
Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 393 (1916):
The conceded failure of state conformity called for a substitute. The Federal
government could not follow the states, so it was reasonable to give the states an
opportunity to follow the Federal government. That state which tries to live unto itself
will suffer, if it does not perish. In spite of ourselves, we are all for one and one for
all .... [A] simple, scientific correlated system of rules, such as would be prepared
and promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a model
that would, for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states.
13. Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
615, 615 (2002); see also Carrington, supra note 12, at 938 ("Over the last three decades, there
has been a degeneration of federal civil practice.").
14. See Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 737 (criticizing the trend toward
localism in federal rulemaking); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579 (1991) (suggesting that judges, "impatient with
the failure of the national system to solve pressing, indeed urgent, procedural problems," craft
local rules as a means of experimenting with pragmatic solutions to those perceived problems,
e.g., discovery abuse, frivolous civil rights suits, inordinately heavy caseloads.); Main, supra note
7, at 315-16 ('The proliferation of local rules of procedure in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, and the 1993 amendments to the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all have contributed to an increasing diversity of procedures in
federal courts across the country."); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 380 (1992) ("What began as an aesthetic of procedural simplicity
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There has been widespread scholarly criticism of the "movement to
localism" 15 in federal procedure and the paucity of sound empirical
research to inform the flurry of discovery reforms implemented by
recent federal rules amendments, local court rules and Civil Justice
Reform Plans implemented by district courts pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA").16 Second, although the federal
rules once exerted a powerful influence on state procedure,1 7 during
the last two decades state deference to the federal rules has waned as
state jurisdictions have reasserted their rulemaking independence. In
a 2002 update of his definitive 1986 study comparing state and federal
procedural rules, Professor Oakley observed: "Not only has the trend
toward state conformity to the federal rules stopped accelerating - it
has substantially reversed itself."18
The "trend... away from

has been transformed, over fifty years, into a reigning reality of procedural complexity. Today,
federal practice and procedure is impossibly arcane.")
15. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 759; Tobias, supra note 13, at 615 ('"The
growing balkanization of federal civil procedure has received considerable critical commentary.");
Tobias, supra note 10, at 554 ("Another critical source of mounting dissatisfaction with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been the profound increase in local procedures since the
1938 rules' adoption, a phenomenon that has expanded exponentially in the last quarter
century.").
16. See Chemerinksy & Friedman, supranote 5, at 770-71:
[T]rue experimentation - which can be very valuable - requires accurate data
collection and reporting, control groups, and a basis for assessing success and failure.
The CJRA provides for none of this. Advisory groups necessarily engaged in extremely
unscientific studies of cost and delay, as well as the state of the docket. There were no
national questionnaires or studies. Much of the "evidence" collected was anecdotal....
[P]lans varied widely. For most of the districts there were no control groups. As the
saying goes, "garbage in, garbage out." The Judicial Conference's conclusions cannot
hope to have any real value, because the "data" are so unreliable. Experiments can
yield important information, but not if they are designed improperly.
See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) ("We need fewer mind experiments and more field
experiments, procedural rules as well as procedural theories that are 'based on experience.'. . . A
'veil of ignorance' may be an apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date."); Carrington,
supra note 12, at 962-963, referring to local rules experimentation under the Civil Justice Reform
Act:
Alas, there is very little science to be employed in these experiments. The experiments
are uncontrolled; there is no scientific method employed in planning them; there are
ninety-four experiments proceeding at once; and the experiments were to be
completed within three years, long before secondary or tertiary effects can be
experienced and measured.
See also Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 778 (1998) ("As a
general matter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been drafted without the benefit of
detailed empirical input.").
17. As late as 1979, Professor Rowe observed that "[w]ell over half the states now have civil
rules closely patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and movement toward
adoption of federal-model rules continues in at least some of the other states." Thomas D. Rowe,
A Comment on the Federalismof the FederalRules, 1979 DUKE L. J. 843, 843.
18. Oakley, supra note 11, at 355.
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uniformity and toward localism"19 in the federal rules is manifested in
state civil procedure as well.
The "top-down" federal rules model for achieving inter-state
uniformity has failed. During the past fifteen years, most states have
adopted a bewildering variety of discovery rule amendments that
diverge from the federal model. 20 A select group of trend-setting
states-Arizona, Texas, Colorado, and Illinois-have outdistanced the
federal rules in the pursuit of discovery reform, vying with federal
rulemakers for leadership in discovery reform. 2 1 In 1992, Arizona, a
so-called "replica" state22 that traditionally conformed to the federal
rules model of civil procedure, took off on its own discovery reform
trip, adopting a package of discovery reforms more aggressive than
anything the federal rules have implemented. 23 Colorado, Illinois, and
Texas have followed in this divergence. 24 As illustrated in Part IV,
most states have charted their own paths toward civil discovery
reform, paths that diverge from each other and from the federal
rules. 25 This phenomenon has produced a potpourri of variations in
civil discovery rules. In Part II, I contend that variation in the kinds
of procedural rules that impact on substantive rights is a detriment to
the fair and efficient administration of civil justice, 26 and that the
policy arguments supporting federal rules uniformity are equally
applicable to state court procedure as well.
19. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supranote 5, at 757.
20. See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 613 ("Analysis of the
changes in the discovery provisions of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen
years reveals a very complex situation.").
21. Id. at 647 ("While many states continue to follow the model of the Federal Rules, others
are experimenting with innovations that follow quite different paths. These developments may
be the harbinger of a future procedural regime, changing the traditional roles of both attorneys
and judges in civil litigation.").
22. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986).
23. See Tobias, supra note 13, at 624-27 (discussing the reforms); Thomas A. Zlaket,
Encouraging Litigatorsto be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1993) (in
which the author of Arizona's new discovery rules criticizes the previous rules, which replicated
the federal model, for encouraging lawyers to behave in an overly aggressive and adversarial
manner).
24. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 599 (observing that Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and Colorado
are engaged in a variety of procedural experiments attempting to make civil litigation cheaper,
faster and more efficient."); id. at 613 ("Analysis of the changes in the discovery provisions of the
fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen years reveals a very complex situation.")
For a cogent "overview of general trends in state discovery rules together with vignettes of four
specific states - Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado," see id. at 613-37.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 777-78 ("The diversity of practice [in
federal courts] is troubling, because discovery most assuredly is a practice that affects
substantive rights and litigation outcomes.").
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In deviating from the federal model, state judicial systems have
experimented with state civil discovery, picking and choosing from a
smorgasbord 27 of initiatives aimed at controlling excessive discovery
and discovery abuse. In so doing, the states are functioning as
"laborator[ies] for experimentation with promising mechanisms ' 28 for
reducing cost and delay in discovery. The proliferation of variations
among state discovery rules, though subject to the same criticism
directed at procedural disuniformity in the federal courts, has created
fertile soil for empirical evaluation of these reforms to assess their
efficacy. The resulting empirical data could be shared among all
states, informing their continuing efforts at rules reform. Yet, no
empirical evaluations have been forthcoming.
For example, in
Arizona, one of the leaders in aggressive discovery reform, no
empirical evaluation of the Zlaket Rules has been undertaken during
the nine years these rules have been in effect. 29 As proposed in Part
III, state jurisdictions should collaborate to fashion model rules of civil
procedure by fulfilling their role as laboratories for procedural
innovation 30 based upon a coordinated and controlled process of
empirical research.
A central thesis of this Article is that interstate procedural
uniformity remains a desirable, viable and achievable goal despite the
failure of the federal-rules-model approach. The momentum for
developing uniform state procedural rules must, however, originate
from the states themselves. The states have already shown their
27. Professors Chemerinksy and Friedman use the term "smorgasbord" to describe the Civil
Justice Reform Act's Model Plan which contains a "menu" of case management techniques from
which federal district courts can choose in formulating their respective case management plans
under the Act. Id. at 771.
28. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 613 (referring to "the changes in the discovery provisions
of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen years" as an illustration in the
procedural arena of Justice Brandeis's characterization of states as "laboratories" in which
experiments in the law might be conducted.); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at 629-30:
The Arizona Supreme Court should attempt to determine exactly how well its
discovery reforms instituted during the 1990s have worked .... The Justices should
carefully assemble, analyze and synthesize the maximum, feasible empirical data
respecting these questions. Minimal empirical data currently exist because the
Arizona Supreme Court has undertaken no formal attempt to study the impacts of the
recent reforms generally, while baselines for comparing the effects of discovery
devices' application have yet to be established specifically.
29. Id. at 628; Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 625 (referring to Arizona's drastic reform of its
civil discovery rules and stating "no statistical confirmation of these premises [underlying the
reforms] is available and no studies have been performed regarding the effect of the rules despite
the fact that the rules have been in effect for more than nine years").
30. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
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willingness to experiment, albeit haphazardly and largely uninformed
by empirical research, with a wide variety of discovery reforms. I
propose that this commitment be channeled, reinforced and sustained
by an institutional mechanism that promotes cooperation and
collaboration among state judicial systems in experimenting with
rules of civil procedure for state courts based upon sound empirical
data. If states refuse to follow the federal lead, they need to fashion a
vigorous rulemaking process that supports a proactive, national
rulemaking role for state courts independent of the federal approach.
By pooling their rulemaking resources, state judicial systems can
leverage their new assertiveness into an authentic and sustainable
leadership role in civil procedure reform that is responsive to the
needs of state courts.
Procedural diversity is built into the federal structure of fifty
state judicial systems, which are natural laboratories for controlled
procedural experimentation. Building upon existing structures, like
the National Center for State Courts, state courts can move towards
developing a model code of civil procedure based upon sound empirical
data developed through centrally-controlled experiments that take
advantage of existing procedural diversity.
I characterize this
approach to state rulemaking as a "new federalism" in the
administration of state civil justice.
One can view a reinvigorated role for the states in crafting
rules of state civil procedure as part of the resurgence of state
32
government authority in substantive law 31 and constitutional rights
promoted by the Rehnquist Court's "new federalism" jurisprudence.
By "protect[ing] the principle that the states enjoy considerable
33
freedom to compete as laboratories of social and economic policies,"
the "new federalism" has reversed, or at least slowed, the erosion of
state authority brought about by the centralizing influence of New
Deal legislation.3 4 In the words of one commentator, the New Deal

31. William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the
Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1181 (2002) ("[T]he
Rehnquist Court has protected the principle that the states enjoy considerable freedom to
compete as laboratories of social and economic policies.")
32. Marianna Brown Bettman, Identical ConstitutionalLanguage: What is a State Court to
Do? The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette, 32 AKRON L. REV. 657, 663 (1999) ("[T]he 'new
federalism' permits state courts to provide greater protection for individual rights under their
state constitutions than is required under federal constitutional standards.").
33. Pryor, supra note 31, at 1181.
34. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,82
IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1281-83 (1997) (viewing the REA in the context of the New Deal and the
balkanization of federal procedure as an aspect of the end of the New Deal). But see Carl Tobias,
Fin-De-Siecle Federal Civil Procedure,51 FLA. L. REV. 641, 643 (1999):
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treated state governments "as little more than convenient districts for
the administration of the federal government's policies." 35 Similarly, in
the procedural arena, recent widespread efforts by state jurisdictions
to experiment with their civil discovery rules heralds a reversal of the
dominant influence of the federal judiciary that was ushered in by the
1938 Rules Enabling Act.
As a procedural variation on the "new federalism" theme, I
propose that state judicial systems continue to develop their
independent rulemaking capabilities, but not by competing with each
other. Rather than competing as laboratories, I propose that states
cooperate as laboratories through a mechanism of controlled
experimentation designed to inform a collaborative rulemaking
process leading to a model code of state civil procedure. Like the
federal rules, these model rules would continue to evolve and improve
through continued controlled experimentation among state courts.
Acting individually, state judiciaries cannot match the rulemaking
resources of the federal courts available through the U.S. Judicial
Conference and the Federal Judicial Center. Collectively, however,
the states can reduce their dependence on the federal judiciary by
developing an enhanced capacity for independent rulemaking through
a mechanism of voluntary cooperation that maximizes the role of state
judicial systems as laboratories of civil procedure.
This Article identifies the possibilities that arise from two
seemingly disparate critiques of contemporary procedural rulemaking:
those that bemoan the lack of procedural uniformity as well as those
that call for systematic empirical data to support rules reform.
Several writers have proposed a system of controlled experimentation

Professor Walker's reliance on the end of the New Deal as an explanation for the
changes enables him to recount a rather neat story; however, what actually
transpired appears more complex, subtle and untidy. I, therefore, offer
complementary explanations for the four alterations and different views of their
import while elaborating his account.
35. Pryor, supra note 31, at 1172-73:
Madison's second challenger appeared in the early twentieth century, with the rise of
the Progressive Movement and later the New Deal. The adversaries of Madisonian
federalism sought increased centralization of government power in the national
government. I will call this view the "National Statist" vision of federalism. New
Dealers have referred to it as "cooperative federalism." Where States' Rights
federalism was centrifugal, National Statist or cooperative federalism was (and is)
centripetal. The key development in the rise of National Statist federalism was the
move away from any real sense that Congress is constrained by Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Thus unleashed, Congress entered a multitude of public policy areas
once understood to be the exclusive domain of state governments, including a wide
variety of business regulation and, more recently, matters of criminal law and public
education. State governments' authority was curtailed. At the limit, state
governments have been treated as little more than convenient districts for the
administration of the federal government's policies, much like the German model.
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within the federal judicial system to resolve the tension that otherwise
exists between the need for local experimentation to provide empirical
36
I
support for rules reform and norm of procedural uniformity.
propose that the fifty state rule-making entities, many of which have
already exercised their independent authority to adopt an enormous
variety of civil discovery reform packages, are uniquely able to take
advantage of controlled experimentation.
As discussed in Part II, most critical commentary addressing
procedural disuniformity focuses on interfederal district fragmentation
of uniform federal procedure. 37 The relatively limited scholarship that
considers the impact of fragmentation on state civil practice focuses on
intrastate disuniformity-the degree to which state civil procedure
diverges from the federal model. 38 Legal scholarship has not taken
the next logical step to assess the costs of interstate disuniformity and
the benefits of uniform rules of state civil procedure. 39 The lack of
scholarly attention to state court rulemaking processes is striking in
light of the increasingly prominent role played by state courts in
discovery reform 40 and the fact that state courts process the vast

36. Carrington, supra note 12, at 962-63; Levin, supra note 14, at 1581-82; Tobias, supra
note 10, at 618; Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field
Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 84 (1998).
37. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 13, at 615 ("The growing balkanization of federal civil
procedure has received considerable critical commentary.").
38. See, e.g., id. at 616:
Although Congress, judges, attorneys and legal academicians have devoted
considerable attention to federal procedure, these observers have essentially ignored
the impacts of federal developments on state civil process. The comparatively limited
comment those effects have received is unfortunate, because the individuals and
entities with responsibility for state procedural reform often have derived helpful
guidance from activities at the federal level.
Main, supra note 7, at 324 (noting that intrastate disuniformity "has received very little
attention in the past decade" and suggesting that "[tihis lack of attention is a curious
phenomenon because much of the uniformity of rhetoric devoted to the issue of inter-district
disuniformity is similarly applicable to intra-state disuniformity."); Moskowitz, supra note 12, at
595 ("Although state courts dispose of the vast majority of cases in the United States, academic
writings on procedural matters, particularly discovery, often overlook this area.").
39. The more general question of interstate judicial cooperation and coordination of state
court proceedings has been addressed in the form of a proposal for a mechanism for interstate
transfer and consolidation of state court litigation similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See Elinor P.
Schroeder, Relitigationof Common Issues: The Failureof Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative
Proposal, 67 IOWA L. REV. 917, 963-79 (1982) (discussing proposal for interstate transfer and
consolidation).
40. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 613 (referring to "the changes in the discovery provisions
of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen years" as an illustration in the
procedural arena of Justice Brandeis's characterization of states as "laboratories" in which
experiments in the law might be conducted.)
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majority of civil cases. 4 1 Section II refocuses the widespread criticism
of the balkanization of the federal rules on the variety of civil
discovery reforms implemented by state courts with little or no
empirical support. Part II then argues that the "aesthetic" 42 of the
procedural reform that informed the federal rules in 1938-"careful,
informed study that leads to the adoption and amendment of simple
rules that are uniform throughout the country" 43-is
equally
applicable to state civil procedure.
Critics have also condemned the lack of "systematic,
cumulative data [to improve the civil justice system, which] makes it
possible for far-reaching policy proposals to be advanced on the basis
of tendentious anecdotes," 44 noting in particular that "little empirical
45
research has been done to objectify and quantify discovery abuse."
Part III develops the premise that a system of controlled empirical
research is not only necessary for sound rule-making, but also
promotes the benefits of procedural uniformity. The link between
empirical research and uniformity was noted, on the federal level, by
Professor Tobias, who argued that "[t]he maximum applicable
empirical material must inform . . . attempts to limit proliferation [of
federal court local rules]. '"46 I argue, in Part II, that the seemingly
random experimentation underway on the state level needs to be
harnessed to improve the quality of rulemaking through a coordinated
rulemaking process that empirically evaluates controlled experiments
and shares resulting data to improve the quality of rulemaking and,
where warranted, provides uniform approaches to shared problems
and conditions among the states.
Part IV's survey of recent state civil discovery reforms
illustrates the magnitude of the problem of interstate disuniformity by
showing that state jurisdictions have experimented with a myriad of
discovery reforms 47 aimed at what is perceived to be runaway
41. Id. at 595 ("Although state courts dispose of the vast majority of cases in the United
States, academic writings on procedural matters, particularly discovery, often overlook this
area.").
42. See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 380 (citing generally Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gift To Be
Simple: Aesthetics And ProceduralReform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1990)).
43. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
44. Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy: Systematic Collection of Data
on the Civil Justice System is Needed for Reasoned and Effective Policy Making, 77 JUDICATURE
185, 185 (1994)
45. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) "Much Ado About Nothing?," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 703 (1995).
46. Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 533, 579 (2002).
47. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 599 (observing that Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and Colorado
"are engaged in a variety of procedural experiments attempting to make civil litigation cheaper,
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discovery. Part V sets forth my proposal for a mechanism to centralize
and coordinate controlled state procedural experimentation and to
fashion model rules of state civil procedure.
II. THE CASE FOR PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY
A. The Problem of InterstateProceduralDisuniformity
1. The Decline of Inter-Federal District Uniformity: Cracks in the
Federal Rules Model of National Procedural Uniformity
The drafters of the Federal Rules not only intended to provide
a uniform body of federal procedure applicable in every federal district
court-inter-federaldistrict court uniformity- 48 but also to provide a
model of procedural uniformity to be followed by the states (intra-state
uniformity).49 Reformers thereby hoped to produce uniform state
procedure-inter-stateuniformity.50 As the role of the Federal Rules
in achieving inter-federal district uniformity of procedure declined
during the 1980s and 1990s, so, too, did the role of the federal rules as
a model of uniformity for the states to emulate.
The federal model of simplified and uniform rules has
fragmented. 51
Professor Tobias cogently describes this widely
criticized phenomenon:
Observers of the increasingly fractured procedural regime in the federal arena have
voiced concerns about the mounting numbers of strictures, the accelerating pace of
procedural change and the growing inconsistency of the requirements imposed.
Illustrative are the major 1983 and 1993 federal discovery amendments, which new
discovery provisions further revised in December 2000. The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 concomitantly encouraged all ninety-four federal districts to prescribe local
procedures for reducing expense and delay in civil litigation, and these measures

faster and more efficient."); id. at 613 ("Analysis of the changes in the discovery provisions of the
fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen years reveals a very complex situation.").
48. Subrin, supra note 8, at 80 ("[The twentieth century ABA movement for uniform
federal procedural rules started with the proposition that the Conformity Act of 1872 had failed,
and that lawyers had difficulty knowing what procedure would apply in any given federal district
court. The procedure should be the same in every federal district court, the argument went
(inter-federal district court uniformity).")
49. Id. ("The Supreme Court of the United States would make such modern, correlated, and
enlightened rules, the proponents continued, that the states would see the light and follow suit
(intrastate uniformity).").
50. Tobias, supra note 13, at 615 ("The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
hoped to establish those rules as a model that the states could adopt, thus fostering national and
intrastate procedural uniformity.").
51. See Carrington, supra note 12, at 938 ("Over the last three decades, there has been a
degeneration of federal civil practice.").
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conflicted with the Federal Rules. The fragmentation described above is most clearly
manifested in the area of discovery, which is a critical feature of many modern civil
52
lawsuits.

Professor Resnik explains the proliferation of local rule-making
as a result of the "exercise of individualized discretion" by federal
judges that is "built into the federal rules of 1938" and is a "feature
that works against the aspiration of uniformity. '53 By the 1980s, a
"failing faith 54 in flexible pleading rules and liberal discovery to foster
decisions on the merits-a fundamental precept of the initial Federal
Rules-accelerated local rules proliferation, further undermining the
precept of procedural uniformity.
Congressional and judicial
impatience with the national rulemaking authority's perceived failure
to address problems of cost and delay associated with the so-called
55
"litigation explosion," attributed largely to liberal discovery,
prompted a variety of local experiments that circumvented and, in
some cases, conflicted with the Federal Rules. Judges have taken
matters into their own hands, utilizing "local rules in an effort to
shape pragmatic solutions. ''56 Congressional impatience with the pace

52. Tobias, supra note 13, at 615.
53. Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging,49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 200 (1997):
The observation that trial judges are deeply committed to their own discretion helps
to explain the proliferation of local rulemaking, both before and after the CJRA.
Uniformity is, inevitably, in tension with the exercise of individualized discretion, and
thus, built into the federal rules of 1938 is a feature that works against the aspiration
of uniformity.
54. Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
497 (1986) ("We have moved from arguments about the need to foster judicial decisions "on the
merits" by simplifying procedure to conversations about the desirability of limiting the use of
courts in general and of the federal courts in particular."); id. at 540 ("In the nineteen-thirties,
the rulemakers railed against the technical, 'rigid' procedure of their time and sought flexibility
by liberal rules of pleading and by discovery (to get to the 'truth' quickly).").
55. Tobias, supra note 46, at 540:
By the 1970s, a number of developments had fostered increasing disenchantment with
the federal rules. Some observers contended that the federal courts were encountering
a 'litigation explosion," whereby counsel and parties were pursuing too many civil
lawsuits, a number of which lacked merit. Additional critics found troubling the abuse
of the litigation process, particularly discovery, by lawyers and clients. Certain judges
and attorneys argued that the federal rules were unresponsive to these difficulties
and that a few features of the initial rules, namely their flexible, open-ended
character, especially during discovery, might even have led to the complications.
56. See Levin, supra note 14, at 1579:
I suggest that we are dealing with nothing less than how courts, impatient with the
failure of the national system to solve pressing, indeed urgent, procedural problems,
utilize local rules in an effort to shape pragmatic solutions ....
Judges perceive
problems: discovery abuse, frivolous civil rights suits, or simply inordinately heavy
caseloads. Solutions are proposed, and the judges either have confidence in them or
are willing to try them because others have confidence in them. Local rules offer the
most expeditious means of experimenting.
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of change in the Federal Rules to reduce cost and delay contributed to
local rules proliferation through the enactment in 1990 of the CJRA,
57
which spawned a variety of cost and delay reduction plans.
Some observers predict the eventual demise of the federal rules
Advisory Committee's traditional role as the guardian of uniformity.
According to one writer, the federal rules Advisory Committee itself
"dealt a serious symbolic, and perhaps fatal, blow to the cause of a
national, uniform procedural code" when it included a provision
allowing local districts to alter, or to opt out completely from, the 1993
required disclosure amendment to Rule 26.58 Another commentator
attributes "the demise of the influence of the Advisory Committee in
judicial rulemaking" 59 to the politicization of procedure that is shifting
the locus of federal rulemaking authority to Congress, which is more

See also Tobias, supra note 46, at 540-41 ("Local procedures became important vehicles for
implementing several solutions - such as increased emphasis on managerial judging and on the
pretrial process and enhanced judicial discretion - which districts and judges applied in
attempting to rectify the problems identified in this paragraph.").
57. See, e.g., Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 758-59 ("The CJRA expressly
invites every one of the ninety-four districts to adopt its own model of how federal litigation
should proceed, dealing with such important topics as case management, tracking for different
cases, motion practice, and alternative dispute resolution."); Mullenix, supra note 14, at 380-81:
The Civil Justice Reform Act is at war with the concept of uniform procedural rules
throughout the federal district courts. The Act instead directly contributes to an
increased balkanization of federal civil procedure, a process that began with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which authorizes the creation of local rules. What began as
an aesthetic of procedural simplicity has been transformed, over fifty years, into a
reigning reality of procedural complexity. Today, federal practice and procedure is
impossibly arcane.... A federal practitioner must now know, in addition to the
Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, the existing local rules of ninety-four
district courts and eleven federal circuits. The practitioner simply cannot know the
procedures of any other federal district without looking them up, just as an out-ofstate practitioner must research the rules of a foreign jurisdiction. As a consequence
of the Act, the practitioner's life will now be further complicated by the overlay of new
rules, measures, and programs promulgated and implemented on the recommendation
of ninety-four local advisory groups.
See also Tobias, supra note 10, at 548 (noting that the adoption by district courts of a wide
variety of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans as required by the CJRA "have further
fragmented the already fractured condition of civil procedure and may actually have increased
expense and delay in civil suits ....).
58. Tobias, supra note 46, at 552-53:
The enormous symbolic significance of the local option mechanism may well have
surpassed its great pragmatic importance. Many federal courts experts have long
viewed the Advisory Committee as the "Defender of the Faith" in the national,
consistent procedural regime which the 1938 Rules instituted. When that entity,
seemingly for purposes of political expediency or to revive its diminishing influence,
acceded to an approach which facilitated the prescription of conflicting strictures that
govern a significant constituent of the increasingly emphasized pretrial process,
thereby exacerbating local proliferation, the Committee dealt a serious symbolic, and
perhaps fatal, blow to the cause of a national, uniform procedural code.
59. Linda Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991).
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directly responsive to the political influence of lobbyists. 60 Local rules
have been used by Congress and the Judicial Conference as a
61
convenient tool with which to evade politically volatile issues.
Inter-federal district court disuniformity complicates federal
litigation, increasing cost and delay in the administration of civil
justice. 62 Many legal scholars have criticized inter-federal district
court disuniformity in the realm of discovery, which "is a practice that
affects substantive rights and litigation outcomes." 63 In this vein,
Professor Subrin asks whether "similar cases [can] be decided in
similar ways and with similar results when the discovery rules and
other rules have become so divergent." 64 Critics have described
66
65
contemporary federal procedure as "impossibly arcane," cluttered
by local rules that are "overly complex, very different, and even
67
inconsistent, or are quite difficult to find, comprehend, and satisfy."
60. Id. at 801-02 (1991) ("[T]he inevitable politicization of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee foreshadows the decline of that body's role in procedural rule-drafting.... [Tihe
partisan rule reformers eventually will abandon the Advisory Committee and take their causes
to other rulemaking bodies, namely the congressional committees with federal rulemaking
oversight.").
61. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2019 ("Perhaps because there is no consensus, Congress and
the Judicial Conference repeatedly try to solve problems by leaving important questions to local
rules.")
62. Carrington, supra note 12, at 951 ("By the mid-1980s, the legal clutter by local rules
had become an impediment to the practice of law, a source of cost and delay, and a significant
trap for the unwary.").
63. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 778 ("The diversity of practice [in federal
courts] is troubling, because discovery most assuredly is a practice that affects substantive rights
and litigation outcomes."); Subrin, supra note 6, at 2023-24 (noting significant difference among
federal district courts with respect to local discovery rules, including rules imposing discovery
limits); Tobias, supra note 13, at 615 ('The fragmentation [of the federal procedural rules] ...is
most clearly manifested in the area of discovery, which is a critical feature of many modern civil
lawsuits.").
64. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2047.
65. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 14, at 380:
What began as an aesthetic of procedural simplicity has been transformed, over fifty
years, into a reigning reality of procedural complexity. Today, federal practice and
procedure is impossibly arcane .... A federal practitioner must now know, in addition
to the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, the existing local rules of
ninety-four district courts and eleven federal circuits. The practitioner simply cannot
know the procedures of any other federal district without looking them up, just as an
out-of-state practitioner must research the rules of a foreign jurisdiction. As a
consequence of the [Civil Justice Reform Act], the practitioner's life will now be
further complicated by the overlay of new rules, measures, and programs promulgated
and implemented on the recommendation of ninety-four local advisory groups.
(emphasis added)
66. Carrington, supra note 12, at 946 ("Localism creates legal clutter ......
67. Tobias, supra note 10, at 605 (noting the adverse impact on cost and delay of
disuniformity in federal rules: "Judges, lawyers, and parties simply confront too many
requirements, substantial numbers of which are overly complex, very different, and even
inconsistent, or are quite difficult to find, comprehend, and satisfy.").
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They also assert that such rules give a tactical advantage to the local
''cognoscenti" over the outside practitioner and to the "expert litigator
Other
over the lawyer making episodic appearances in court." 68
scholars have observed that localism increases the cost of legal
services by requiring out-of-district litigants to retain local counsel,
restricting competition for legal services. 69 Local procedure has also
been criticized for "complicat[ing] federal practice, particularly for
entities that litigate in multiple districts, such as the Department of
Justice, public interest organizations like the Sierra Club, and large
70
corporations."
As noted in Parts II.A.3 and illustrated in Part IV, state
discovery practice-exhibits the same
procedure-particularly
phenomenon of fragmentation that afflicts federal procedure.
The problem of fragmentation of federal procedure is
compounded by non-existent or inadequate empirical research to
evaluate local procedural experimentation. Historically, local rules
experimentation has frequently informed national rulemaking
policy. 71 Viewing federal district courts as procedural laboratories,
some observers have defended procedural diversity as a "perceived
good... in allowing experiments on a small scale." 72 However, without
sound empirical evaluation, the potential advantages of local

68. Carrington, supra note 12, at 948 (noting that legal clutter diverts litigation from the
merits to satellite controversies, "gives undue advantage to congnoscenti," gives local lawyers "an
advantage over counsel from other districts," and favors the "expert litigator over the lawyer
making episodic appearances in court."); Mullenix, supra note 14, at 380 ("The practitioner
simply cannot know the procedures of any other federal district without looking them up, just as
an out-of-state practitionermust research the rules of a foreign jurisdiction.")(emphasis added).
69. Carrington, supra note 12, at 946 (noting that legal clutter increases "the cost of legal
services... by a diminution of competition and retention of redundant counsel"); Robert G. Bone,
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 932 (1999) ("Specialized local rules add to entry costs and reinforce
the market power of local lawyers, at least if competition in the district is already weak. Indeed,
one might predict the emergence of rather detailed local rules, since complex rules raise the costs
of entry.").
70. Tobias, supra note 10, at 605 ("These developments.., enormously complicat[ed]
federal practice, particularly for entities that litigate in multiple districts, such as the
Department of Justice, public interest organizations like the Sierra Club, and large
corporations."); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1423-24 (1992) (criticizing inter-district disuniformity, e.g.,
complicates efforts of lawyers who litigated nationally, public interest litigants, lack of neutrality
of increasingly balkanized procedure; "[p]rocedural choices that enhance complexity and
disuniformity can foster particular values and serve specific interests;" balkanized procedure is
fertile ground for capitalizing on tactical advantages).
71. Resnik, supra note 53, at 157 ("National rulemaking-be it proposed by Congress or the
federal judiciary-frequently represents codification of practice and reflection of change rather
than the commencement of newly-minted regimes.") (emphasis removed).
72. Levin, supra note 14, at 1581.
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experimentation remain unrealized. Professor Levin, one of many
scholars advocating controlled experimentation, confirms the paucity
of sound empirical data: "With a few notable exceptions, results are
reported on the basis of impressions: 'We think this is working.., the
bar seems satisfied, or at least the bar can live with it.' 73
Although the CJRA required district courts to collect data to
evaluate their respective case management plans, the data were not
empirically sound. Professor Carrington has criticized this politically
tainted effort at empirical research:
Alas, there is very little science to be employed in these experiments. The experiments
are uncontrolled; there is no scientific method employed in planning them; there are
ninety-four experiments proceeding at once; and the experiments were to be completed
within three years, long before secondary or tertiary effects can be experienced and
measured. In this respect, the Act is further confirmation of the disjunction
between the
74
politics of court reform and the realities of what happens in court.

2. The Decline of Intra-State Uniformity: Fading Influence of the
Federal Rules Model on State Procedure
The disintegration of the uniform federal rules ideal has been
accompanied by a decline in the federal judiciary's influence over state
procedure. Professor Oakley, in an update of his 1986 nationwide
survey of state procedure conformity with the Federal Rules,
concludes:
My fresh look at the federal rules in state courts reveals that, from a state perspective,
the FRCP have lost credibility as avatars of procedural reform. Federal procedure is less
75
influential in state courts today than at anytime in the past quarter-century.

As a concomitant of waning federal leadership in procedural
rulemaking, states are assuming greater responsibility for their own
court rules. Consider the following observation by Professor Seymour
Moskowitz in his survey of recent changes in state procedure rules:
While many states continue to follow the model of the Federal Rules, others are
experimenting with innovations that follow quite different paths. These developments
may be the harbinger of a future procedural regime, changing the traditional roles of
76
both attorneys and judges in civil litigation.

73. Id. at 1582.
74. Carrington, supra note 12, at 962-63.
75. Oakley, supra note 11, at 355.
76. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 647; see also Subrin, supra note 6, at 2045 n.233 (noting
that, in an official "Statement of Duties for Reporter to an Advisory Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure," one of the duties listed is "[to examine] the state experience in judicial
procedure, giving particular attention to changes which have been made by those states which
have followed the federal rules in adapting their local needs."); Oakley, supra note 11, at 359
(claiming that states "have elected to abstain from experimenting with dubious 'new ways' of
adjudicating civil actions than that they have chosen to 'return to ... old ways that they had
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In 1992, Arizona, a former died-in-the-wool replica state 77 that
reflexively followed the federal rules, 78 broke new ground in discovery
79
reform. As more fully detailed in Part IV, Arizona's Zlaket Rules
created a comprehensive mechanism of required disclosure8 0 that
substantially replaced formal discovery. Arizona's disclosure rules are
far more ambitious than the 1993 federal rules disclosure
amendment8 l and represented a radical departure from the 1938
federal model of attorney-managed liberal discovery. The Zlaket
Rules attempt nothing less than the elimination of "the adversarial
component from the pretrial exchange of information,"8 2 relegating
civil discovery "to a process for filling gaps in the disclosure
statements."83
Arizona's role reversal from procedural follower to leader
dramatically symbolizes the emerging confidence of state jurisdictions
to engage in procedural experimentation. Arizona was the first state
to emulate the federal model8 4 because its bench and bar believed that
"the Federal Rules were the product of thousands of lawyers, and
Arizona was unlikely to improve upon them."8 5 Fifty years later, the
Zlaket Rules reflect a newly emergent confidence of Arizona's bench
and bar that the state's "discovery scheme is superior to the existing
federal scheme in that it better serves the needs of the Arizona
judiciary, lawyers, parties and citizens."8 6 The Arizona judiciary's
previously renounced. It is the Federal Rules that appear to have moved away from the states,
rather than vice versa.").
77. Oakley & Coons, supra note 22, at 1377.
78. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 2027-28 (noting, as late as 1967, that "Arizona would rather
be uniform than right").
79. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 598-99 ('Thomas Zlaket, author of Arizona's new discovery
rules, articulates this indictment of discovery [as too expensive, too time consuming and often
abusive] and argues the previous rules encouraged lawyers to act in an overly aggressive and
adversarial manner.").
80. For a comprehensive summary of the Zlaket Rules, see Moskowitz, supra note 12, at
623-27.
81. In 2000, the federal disclosure rules were amended to reduce the scope of automatic
disclosure, "so that parties will have to divulge less information before undertaking formal
discovery." Subrin, supra note 6, at 2027-28.
82. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 624 (citing ARiz. R. CIV. P. 26.1 cmt.).
83. Id. at 623-24.
84. Oakley & Coons, supra note 22, at 1381; Subrin, supra note 6, at 2026 ("In 1940,
Arizona became the first state to change its civil procedure to follow the federal model.").
85. Id. at 2027 (italics added).
86. See Tobias, supra note 13, at 616 (emphasis added):
Arizona has recently participated in considerable discovery reform, which differs
somewhat from the federal discovery scheme. Moreover, the Arizona bench and bar
may believe that their discovery scheme is superior to the existing federal scheme in
that it better serves the needs of the Arizona judiciary, lawyers, parties and citizens.
Id. at 627:
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dissatisfaction with recent amendments to the Federal Rules8 7 and its
willingness to depart from the federal discovery rules reflect a state
rulemaking process that has matured since the Federal Rules were
adopted. Arizona, by "tailor[ing] the reform of discovery and the
pretrial process more precisely to the perceived problems with
discovery and the litigation system in the Arizona state courts,"8 8 set a
tone for state court rulemaking that manifests a heightened
awareness of the differences between state and federal courts.
Texas, Illinois, and Colorado8 9 followed Arizona's lead in
crafting their own custom-tailored models of civil discovery and case
management reform that depart significantly from the federal
model, 90 as more fully set forth in Part IV.
One can only speculate about the causes of the declining
influence of the federal rules model. First, the diminished authority of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to maintain inter-federal district
uniformity may also account in part for the decreasing gravitational
pull of the Federal Rules on the states. 9 1 A second contributing factor
may be the dubious merit of some of the recent federal discovery
amendments. 9 2 For instance, the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule
26(b) that presumptively narrowed the scope of discovery has been
universally criticized by legal scholars. 9 3 As a result, Professor Oakley
The Arizona Supreme Court maintained a discovery system closely modeled on the
federal approach and essentially premised the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
governing discovery on the federal analogues for a half-century. The Arizona Supreme
Court only departed from this practice in meaningful ways during the 1990s when the
Justices decided to institute significant reform of civil discovery.... [T]he Arizona
provisions differed somewhat from the federal changes [instituted in 1993] apparently
because of dissatisfaction with the federal modifications and because the Arizona
Supreme Court seemingly wished to tailor the reform of discovery and the pretrial
process more precisely to the perceived problems with discovery and the litigation
system in the Arizona state courts.
87. Id. at 627.
88. Id.
89. See Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 599 ("[Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado] are
engaged in a variety of procedural experiments attempting to make civil litigation cheaper faster
and more efficient.").
90. See Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 619-32 (providing case studies of Texas, Arizona,
Illinois, and Colorado).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
92. Oakley, supra note 11, at 359 (admitting to a belief that "not all the 'newest' federal
rules are 'the best"' and speculating that "the states have elected to abstain from experimenting
with dubious 'new ways' of adjudicating civil actions than that they have chosen 'to return to...
old ways' that they have previously renounced.").
93. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 594 (2001), referring to the "good cause" burden on the party
seeking subject matter relevant discovery:
The party who is the target of the discovery request generally has greater knowledge
of what information is responsive under the subject-matter standard and of the degree
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suggests that "[i]t is the Federal Rules that appear to have moved
away from the states, rather than vice versa."94 Third, although local
procedural experimentation on both the state and federal levels is
nothing new and, as noted by Professor Resnik, has often informed
federal rulemaking, the states may have caught a more intense form
of discovery reform fever than that which stimulated federal district
courts to experiment with cost and delay reduction measures. 95 State
courts labor under a vastly heavier caseload than federal courts and
have fewer resources. 96 While the civil caseload of state courts of
general jurisdiction increased by 32 percent between 1984 and 1999,
new cases filed in federal courts decreased. 97 A fourth contributing
factor to declining federal influence on state rules may be the
emerging perception among state rulemakers that federal rules
solutions to cost and delay may not be sufficiently tailored to the
different circumstances of state courts. For example, one writer
suggests that resource-poor state judiciaries may be less receptive to
hands-on, labor intensive judicial management, and more inclined to
use resource-conserving techniques like presumptive limits, 98 standing

to which this information is arguably minor, expensive, inconvenient, or sensitive. The
resisting party is far better equipped to make a case for the exercise of judicial
discretion limiting discovery. The party seeking discovery is to some extent "flying
blind" when trying to make a "good cause" case for broad discovery.
See also Carl Tobias, The 2000 Federal Civil Rules Revisions, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 885
(2001) (providing additional criticisms of the discovery rules).
94. Oakley, supra note 11, at 359.
95. See Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 611 ("Similar to developments in federal procedure,
the trend to limitations on discovery in state courts began in the 1970s.").
96. See Moskowitz, supranote 12, at 612:
The high volume of cases, shortage of judges and courtrooms and other deficiencies in
the infrastructure needed to handle cases are widely acknowledged today. In 1999,
more than ninety-one million new cases were filed in state courts nationwide, almost
the exact number filed in 1998.
Subrin, supra note 8 at 82-83 ("The federal court system has considerably more court personnel
than in most, if not all, state trial courts."); National State Court Caseload Trends, 1984-1993, 1
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS 1 (Nat'l Cent. for State

Courts ed., 1995) ("State courts accounted for over 98 percent of [90 million cases processed
annually by federal and state courts combined from 1984 to 1993]. In 1993, state courts of
general jurisdiction handled 85 times as many criminal cases and 27 times as many civil cases as
the U.S. District Courts, with only 14 times as many judges."), available at http://www.
ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/Highlights/vollnol .pdf.
97. B. OSTROM ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1999-2000: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 14 Nat'l Cent. for State Courts ed., 2000),

availableat http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearchlcsp/1999-2000_Files/19992000_EWSC- Front
.pdf.
98. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2045 ("If the federal courts see their primary function as
resolving complex disputes, they may tailor their procedures to fit that image; if the state courts
are more concerned with routine cases, they may emphasize limiting, definitional procedural
rules or summary processes with few procedural steps."); id. at 2036-37:
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case management orders (e.g., Colorado) and case tracking (e.g.,
Colorado's simplified procedures for cases under $100,00099).
As
Professor Subrin suggests: "it may not make sense for state courts to
use federal procedure as a model."'10 0 Finally, the political influence of
the elite defense bar on federal rulemakers is counterbalanced in
many states by the influence of the plaintiffs bar.101
3. The Problem of Uncoordinated Procedural Experimentation by
States In an Era of Increasingly National State Court Litigation: A
Crazy Quilt of Procedural Variation
During the last fifteen years, most states, like the federal
district courts, have engaged in haphazard, uncoordinated procedural
experimentation guided by little or no empirical data. Like the
"Babel" 10 2 of local federal court procedure, state pretrial rules reflect a
crazy quilt of confusing procedural variation that complicates state
practice for out-of-state practitioners, especially counsel who defend
corporations in state court litigation around the country.1 0 3 Yet

Many states have been reluctant to try to deal with discovery abuse by ad hoc, caseby-case judicial determinations .......
'[Tlhe federal amendments are tailored to a
federal system, which, unlike Massachusetts, relies on assigned rather than circuit
judges, and on the availability of magistrates.' [quoting the Massachusetts Standing
Advisory Committee of Civil Procedure Rules] ... Massachusetts is by no means the
only replica state to withhold its adoption of the new federal amendments ....
Thus,
very little of the population is covered by up-to-date Federal Rules in state court.
99. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 16.1.
100. Subrin, supra note 8, at 83.
101. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politicsand Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 614 (2001):
[E]lite lawyers have always had inordinate influence on national legal policy. The
[federal] Rulemakers remain inordinately influenced by the procedural views of the
elite bar, occasionally at the expense of other elements of the bar and the profession
and society as a whole. If anything, the problem has become more pronounced as the
private Corporate bar has taken on a greater role in Rulemaking.
Kevin Livingston, Legislator's Ire Can't Stop the Thial Lawyers, THE RECORDER, May 16, 2002, at
1 (referring to "the chummy relationship between the attorneys, who contribute a lot of money to
campaigns, and the [California legislature's Judiciary] committee members, many of whom have
a reputation for championing consumer causes"); Bill Ainsworth, Silicon Valley's Political
Coming of Age, THE RECORDER, Oct. 31, 1996, at 2 ("The latest disclosure reports by the
Consumer Attorneys of California show that the plaintiffs attorneys have raised $1 million for
legislative candidates this year-about twice as much as the California Technology Alliance.");
Peter Scheer, Plaintiffs Lawyers Are Their Own Worst Enemies, THE RECORDER, Mar. 1, 1996, at
2 ("Whatever reserve of goodwill lawyers once enjoyed has been exhausted by the trial lawyers'
relentless manipulation of the legislative process for their own advantage.").
102. See, e.g., Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5 at 759 ("[Today the proliferation of
local rules and the trend to local models of adjudication threaten to turn federal practice into a
veritable Tower of Babel in which no court follows the process of any sister court.").
103. Moskowitz, supranote 12, at 599:
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scholarly commentary on inter-district court disuniformity largely
ignores similar problems caused by inter-state disuniformity. This
blind spot is curious in light of the applicability of the critiques of
10 5
localism in federal procedure 0 4 to inter-state procedural variation.
Litigation in state court is increasingly national in scope. The
National Center for State Courts reported in Spring 2003 that "98
10 6
percent of mass tort cases are ultimately resolved in state courts."'
One commentator has noted the "specter of ever-expanding large-scale
litigation engulfing state and federal judicial systems. . ".'."107 Largescale litigation, defined as "related cases involving numerous parties
and spanning multiple forums," includes simple multiparty accidents
as well as complex toxic tort and product defect actions.1 08 The
American Law Institute has recognized that "huge multi-party,
multiforum disputes have become a recurring feature of modern
litigation."'' 0 9 Increasingly, class actions-including those representing
multistate classes-have been brought in state courts since the
Supreme Court in Synder, II ° Zahn"' and Eisen 1 2 "knocked nonSome [state court discovery rules] now utilize different discovery procedures in
different types of cases, a departure from the "transubstantive" nature of the federal
rules. Mandatory disclosure is a central pretrial concept in many jurisdictions, with
requirements far beyond those mandated in federal courts. A significant number limit
the traditional discovery tools - depositions, interrogatories, requests for production of
documents, etc. - in important ways. Some states now explicitly require judges to
"manage" the pretrial process, and mandate or encourage the use of court drafted
"standard discovery" in lieu of party-controlled information gathering.
(citations omitted)
104. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 61-71.
105. Cf. Main, supra note 7, at 324 (noting that intra-state disuniformity "has received very
little attention in the past decade" and that "[tihis lack of attention is a curious phenomenon
because much of the uniformity rhetoric devoted to the issue of inter-district uniformity is
similarly applicable to intra-state uniformity.").
106. Mass Torts: Lessons in Competing Strategies and Unintended Consequences, , 2 CIVIL
ACTION 1, 1-2 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts ed., 2003).
107. William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation
Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (1995).
108. Id. at 1529; see also AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 1-2 (Tentative
Draft No. 3 1992) ("[A] wide variety of complex cases, such a products liability, insurance
coverage, and shareholder derivative suits, which do not involve federal questions, often must be
brought in state courts" and noting that "the explosion in complex litigation extends to state
courts ..
"http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=O&tabid=l 1
[hereinafter ALI Complex Litigation Project].
109. AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 12 (1994).
110. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (plaintiffs may not aggregate damage claims
of individual class members in order to satisfy the amount in controversy jurisdictional amount
in diversity cases).
111. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that in diversity class actions
in federal court for money damages, each class member (not just the class representative) must
satisfy the amount in controversy jurisdictional requirement). Since the enactment of the
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federal question class actions out of the federal arena."1 1 3
Contributing to this phenomenon has been the perception that federal
114
courts "have become less receptive to the class action device."
However, during the editing of this Article, Congress enacted
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005115 ("CAFA"), on February 18,
2005, which expanded the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts over
non-federal question class actions in which the aggregated damages
exceed $5 million, thereby partially overruling Zahn, and in which a
member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a state different from any
defendant, thereby providing for minimal diversity.1 1 6 It is too soon to
assess the impact of CAFA on the volume of state-law based class
actions that will be heard in state courts. As expressed by the CoChair of the Class Actions and Derivative Suits Committee of the ABA
Section of Litigation:
Whether broadened federal jurisdiction over state-law based class actions will have its
intended effect of limiting the types and numbers of cases that are able to proceed as
class actions, of course, remains to be seen. In the meantime, however, we can expect to
see defendants vigorously exercise the removal provisions while plaintiffs seek to work
around them, testing the scope of the two-thirds/one-thirds provisions 1 17 and
118
experimenting with new ways to bring "mass actions" that avoid the effect of the law.

Also during the editing of this Article, in June 2005, the United
States Supreme Court, in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Allapattah
Services 1 9, expanded the reach of supplemental jurisdiction in
diversity cases by holding that 28 U.S.C. §1367 statutorily overruled
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, federal courts of appeal are split on the issue whether
Section 1367 of the Act legislatively overrules Zahn. Compare Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524,
527-29 (5th Cir. 1995) (Zahn overruled) and Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77
F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1986) (same) with Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d
214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999) (Zahn not overruled) and Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631,
640 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).
112. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974) (requiring individual notice to
each class member identifiable through reasonable efforts in class actions brought under FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b) (3) regardless of the expense and also requiring the full cost to be borne by the
plaintiffs).
113. Robert A Skirnick & Patricia I. Avery, The State Court Class Action - A Potpourri of
Differences, 20 FORUM 750 (1985) (noting that Snyder and Zahn were intended "to relegate
[small non-federal question cases] to state courts and thereby stem the rising tide of the federal
court docket.").
114. Id.
115. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 ("Federal District
Court Jurisdiction for Interstate Class Actions"), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
116. Id.
117. Id. Section 4 of CAFA provide exceptions to the expanded diversity provisions based, in
part, on the percentage of class members who are citizens of the forum state. Id.
118. Scott L. Nelson, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005: An Analysis (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committee/classact/s5_analysis.pdf.
119. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005)
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Zahn.1 20 Opting for a literal interpretation of Section 1367, the Court
ruled that Congress authorized supplemental jurisdiction over
jurisdictionally insufficient claims by plaintiffs permissively joined
under Rule 20 and by certified class action members pursuant to Rule
23 so long as the "well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim
'1 2 1
that satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement."
The mushrooming asbestos litigation 22 illustrates the growing
threat to the fair administration of civil justice posed by procedural
diversity among state courts. Over the years, most asbestos litigation
has migrated from federal to state courts.1 23 A study by the Rand
Institute for Civil Justice shows that, during the past two decades,
asbestos cases have not only migrated from federal to state courts, but
have also migrated inter-state to a new group of states procedurally
friendly to large verdicts. 124 As a result, procedural variation among
the states combined with substantive law variation to promote forum
shopping by plaintiffs with the attendant risk "that similarly situated
litigants may be treated differently and, as a result, unfairly." 125 The
Rand study confirms the link between differing state procedures and
forum shopping across state lines:

120. Id. at 2625.
121. Id. at 2620-2621.
122. A 2002 study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice reports:
[Tihe last few years have seen sharp increases in the number of asbestos claims filed
annually, the number of firms named as defendants, and the costs of litigation to
these defendants. These increases have led to growing burdens on the courts, greater
costs to the firms named as defendants, and greater numbers of firms filing for
bankruptcy....
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS

AND COMPENSATION 11 (2002). "It is possible that millions of claims have yet to be made....
[W]e have seen only about half of the claims and roughly one-fourth to one-fifth of the eventual
costs." Id. at 86.
123. Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1745
(2002) (noting the volume of asbestos litigation in state courts and the disparity in verdicts: "The
net effect of this decision has been to move all asbestos litigation to the state courts with no
discernable federal-state interaction. The federal system is a substantially reduced force, except
in the context of bankruptcy."); CARROLL, supra note 122, at 29 ("Prior to 1988, 41 percent of the
[asbestos] cases were filed in federal courts; by 1998, less than 20 percent were being filed in
federal courts.").
124. CARROLL, supra note 122, at 32:
"Forum shopping" is a term frequently used to refer to parties' strategic efforts to find
the most attractive forum to pursue their case ....
In the early days of the [asbestos]
litigation (1970-1987), 60 percent of asbestos personal injury cases filed in state courts
were filed in four states: California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois. By 19982000, however, filings of asbestos cases in these states accounted for only 7 percent of
the total. At the other extreme, five states - Mississippi, New York, West Virginia,
Ohio, and Texas - that had accounted for 9 percent of the cases filed before 1988
accounted for 66 percent of filings between 1998 and 2000.
125. ALI Complex Litigation Project, supra note 108, § 4.02 at 51.
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As a formal matter, the system frowns on such forum jockeying. The federal judiciary
seeks to constrain forum shopping by applying the same procedural rules in all federal
courts. Most states model their procedural rules upon the federal rules, but there are
important differences between federal and state rules and among state rules. Because
state substantive law and procedural rules differ - and because, in reality, informal
practices differ across state and federal courts - our federal system provides strong
incentives for plaintiffs to structure their lawsuits in ways that allow them to file in
favorable forums. When defendants are able to do so, they in turn attempt to remove
12 6
cases to forums that are favorable to them.

Asbestos filings have migrated to states with joinder rules that
permit large numbers of claims to be joined in one action. 127 (CAFA
also takes aim at such multistate "mass actions" that it includes
within the definition of "class actions." 128 ) Large-scale consolidation of
asbestos claims "tilts the playing field against defendants" who
frequently settle rather than risk a huge damage award on a single
role of the dice as well as the "potential for juries to peg the amount of
a compensation award to the most injured plaintiff ... however
unrepresentative that plaintiff may be ....-129
For example,
Mississippi's liberal joinder rule "allows plaintiffs from out of state to
join a lawsuit filed by in-state plaintiffs against out-of-state
defendants." According to the Rand report:
The result is something akin to a multistate class action, without the necessity for
plaintiffs to meet the class certification requirement (F.R.C.P. 23[b][3]) that common
issues predominate and without the protections against intra-class conflicts of interest
required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amchem (521 U.S. 591 [19971).130

126. CARROLL, supra note 122, at 33.
127. McGovern, supra note 123, at 1740:
A fourth defendant theory to explain the recent increase in asbestos case filings is
that asbestos litigation is proceeding manageably except in certain jurisdictions and
that plaintiffs' counsel have unfettered access to those jurisdictions for unlimited
numbers of cases. By aggregating thousands of cases where juries will award large
verdicts, plaintiffs' counsel can create a dynamic that forces defendants to settle at
exorbitant values. The mere act of appealing is unavailable if the bonding
requirements alone would wreak financial havoc on a defendant. The solution to this
kind of problem is to restrict the venue and consolidation rules to protect against the
migration of large numbers of cases into unfriendly jurisdictions.
128. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(11)(A), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4:
For purposes of this subsection ....a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action
removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) ....
) and (B) (.
the term 'mass
action' means any civil action ...in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims
involve common questions of law or fact ....
129. CARROLL, supra note 122, at 35:
In asbestos litigation, experience suggests that consolidation tilts the playing field
against defendants, rather than against plaintiffs. As judges who favor mass
consolidations as a calendar-clearing mechanism anticipate, defendants faced with a
consolidated trial of thousands of cases are likely to settle.
130. Id. at 34.
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Trial judges in Maryland, Mississippi and Virginia have "consolidated
thousands of cases for trial" as a docket-clearing mechanism that
13 1
promotes settlement.
Different discovery rules can also produce different substantive
outcomes in asbestos litigation. 132 For example, Mississippi's rules do
not authorize trial judges to order independent medical examinations
of plaintiffs, which handicaps defendants' efforts to refute plaintiffs'
133
allegations of asbestosis symptoms.
The growing burden of mass tort litigation on state courts led
to some tentative attempts at interstate cooperation among state
judiciaries that stopped short of uniform procedural rules. In an effort
to consolidate the burgeoning number of asbestos filings, states joined
together to establish the Mass Tort Litigation Committee of the

131. Id. at 35; see also Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1821, 1822 (1995):
When confronted by mass torts, many judges perceive an alluring commonality among
cases that may lead them to make a critical shift in the balance of policies underlying
tort law and civil procedure. Faced with seemingly repetitive trials and an unending
queue of mass tort plaintiffs, some judges have decided that efficiency concerns call
for a more collective rather than individual treatment of claims. More importantly,
many of these same judges believe that fairness concerns-making sure that each
individual receives some compensation in a reasonable period of time-also lead to a
more collective approach. Thus, the balance of policies-between efficiency and
corrective justice-shifts in the context of mass torts and leads to more nontraditional
aggregative solutions to mass tort issues.
132. Id. at 1821:
Mass torts are different from normal torts. The sheer number of cases-the
quantitative difference-inevitably leads to qualitative differences. The fundamental
reasons for this qualitative shift can best be understood by examining the delicate
tension among the policies underlying both substantive tort law and civil
procedure....
There is also a consensus that our standardized rules of civil procedure are driven
by multiple policies: efficiency, fairness, and behavioral concerns. These policy goals
are also not necessarily consistent in providing us with answers. In the area of
discovery, for example, there is a constant tension among efficiency, fairness, and
behavioral interests in the use or limitation of interrogatories, depositions, and
motions to produce. The recent debate over Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)
[mandatory disclosure] is an apt illustration.
133. The Rand Study cites other procedural variations that promote forum-shopping:
In Texas, where asbestos cases are dispersed over multiple jurisdictions and there are
many different law firms now representing plaintiffs, defendants who are named on
thousands of cases may be noticed on the same day for scores of trials in a dozen or
more jurisdictions. This creates settlement pressures for defendants. In California,
the Code of Civil Procedure § 340.2 gives priority for trial scheduling to all plaintiffs
with a terminal illness, allowing plaintiffs with mesothelioma to get to trial quickly.
Similarly, New York City has a special expedited trial schedule for asbestos plaintiffs
with mesothelioma and other cancers. Elsewhere, plaintiffs with terminal illnesses
sometimes die before their cases reach trial.
CARROLL, supra note 122, at 35.
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Conference of Chief Justices ("CCJ"). 134 In light of the increasingly
national scope of state court litigation and the problems created by
inter-state procedural disuniformity, states should cooperate in
formulating a comprehensive body of uniform civil procedure rules.
B. The Benefits of Inter-State ProceduralUniformity: Toward a New
Federalism in the Process of CraftingRules of State Civil Procedure
Civil litigation in state and federal courts is increasingly
national and international in scope, crossing state lines as well as
national boundaries. 135 For this reason, the aesthetic of the national
procedural uniformity 36 that produced the Federal Rules in 1938 is
even timelier today than it was in the first third of the Twentieth
Century 137 and is applicable to both state and federal procedure.
Procedural uniformity is assuming an international dimension as
people, commerce, investment capital, and-through the worldwide
web and satellite communications-ideas, move more freely across
national boundaries. Drawing inspiration from the same Federal
Rules that were intended to serve as a national model of procedural
uniformity for the states, the American Law Institute ("ALI") recently
drafted a model code of transnational civil procedure designed to apply
to commercial disputes by courts of sovereign nations worldwide. To
justify what might appear to be a utopian dream, the Introduction to
the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure cite the
134. Francis McGovern, supra note 123, at 1745-47 (citing JAMES G. APPLE ET AL., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 31-35
(1997)):
State judges also recognized the need to cooperate and formed the Mass Tort
Litigation Committee ('MTLC') of the Conference of Chief Justices. During the 1980s
and 1990s, judges consolidated massive numbers of asbestos claims in order to parry
the strategy of some defendants who were slowing the velocity of settlements by
refusing to settle until an individual case was set for trial.
135. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 784 ("While it is certainly correct that much
of the practice of law for many practitioners is local, it is also true that increasingly the practice
of law is crossing not only state but national boundaries.").
136. See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 380 (citing Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gift To Be Simple:
Aesthetics And ProceduralReform, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 352 (1990)).
137. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2004 noted Federal Rules drafters' rationale for uniformity
"tied to the needs of the business community":
The commercial need rationale was usually linked to an argument that the states had
become more interrelated by the telephone, telegraph, train, and airplane. A 1928
Senate Judiciary Committee Minority Report favoring uniform federal rules asserted
that:
State lines have not to-day the persuasive force of a hundred or fifty years ago. The
development of the economic resources of the country has brought with it problems
that know no boundaries, and a growing consciousness of the commercial necessity for
national uniformity both in law and its administration.
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"successful effort in the United States a half-century ago to unite
many diverse jurisdictions under one system of procedural rules with
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"' 38 :
The Federal Rules established a single procedure to be employed in federal courts
sitting in 48 different semi-sovereign states, each with its own procedural law, its own
procedural culture, and its own bar. The Federal Rules thereby accomplished what
many thoughtful observers thought impossible - a single system of procedure for four
dozen different legal communities. The project to establish Principles and Rules of
Transnational Civil Procedure conjectures that a procedure for litigation in transactions
across national boundaries is also worth the attempt.139

The list of persons associated with the ALI project reads like a
"Who's Who" of procedural scholars and jurists. 40 The effort to project
the Federal Rules ethic of uniformity into the international legal
arena lends credibility to a similar effort within the United States to
realize the vision of the drafters of the Federal Rules of inter-state
procedural uniformity.
The transnational procedure project
challenges the conventional wisdom "that national procedural systems
are too different from each other and too deeply embedded in local
political history and cultural tradition to permit reduction or
1 41
reconciliation of differences among legal systems.'
The globalization of business and, consequently, the
internationalizing of litigation, have motivated the international legal
community to reframe the role of sovereign national legal systems into
cooperative players willing to move toward a common procedural
system. An analogous process occurred in the United States during
the twentieth century, prompted by the nationalization of business
and, consequently, of litigation. Alongside the "historical conception of
our system as a federal union of independent states"'142 developed a
new conception of states as subdivisions of a "unitary community...
in which all manner of transactions occur without much regard for
state lines."1 43 The impact of this transformation of the American

138. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 2
(Council Draft No. 2, 2003) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE].

139. Id.
140. U.S. scholars include Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania Law School),
Stephen Burbank (University of Pennsylvania Law School), Mary Kay Kane (Hastings College of
the Law), Benjamin Kaplan (Harvard Law School), Andreas Lowenfeld (New York University
School of Law), and Harold Hongju Koh (Yale Law School). U.S. judges include Hon. Anthony
Scirica (Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit), Hon. Diane Wood (Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit), and Hon. Lee Rosenthal (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas).
141. TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 138, at 2.
142. JAMES, supra note 2, § 2.6..
143. Id.
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economy on extending the jurisdictional reach of state courts beyond
state lines was noted by the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need
for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time,
progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a
foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for
personal jurisdictions over nonresidents have evolved
from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v.
14 4
Neff, to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe.

International Shoe's lowering of the jurisdictional barriers of
state borders laid the doctrinal foundation for factoring into the
jurisdictional equation "the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.' 4 5
A new federalism in state court rulemaking emphasizes
collaboration among members of a national system or federation of
state courts similar in concept to the federal court system. The
underlying premise of the federal courts-"that they reflect one court
system doing the nation's business"146-should also guide the states to
move toward collaborative rulemaking as state courts increasingly
litigate much of the nation's business. Divergent state procedural
rules are not the inevitable consequence of a federalism that "accords
to each state great latitude in devising its own laws ... ."147 The fact
that states can constitutionally adopt widely divergent rules does not
mean that, normatively, states should do so. The federal system
dictates a vertical division of judicial power between federal and state
courts. But in terms of the horizontal division of judicial authority
among the states, the Constitution does not mandate the manner in
which fifty separate judicial systems shall exercise their independent
rulemaking authority. States can pool their judicial resources to
develop a uniform model code of civil procedure. Uniform state
procedure tailored to the shared needs of state courts would further
the "interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
,"148
resolution of controversies ..
The traditional concept of federalism "maintains that the
inability of the states to secure important interstate interests on their
own necessitates a centralized federal government endowed with
broad, coercive authority."'149 The expectation of those who drafted the

144. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations omitted).
145. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
146. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 784.
147. Id. at 781-82.
148. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
149. Note, To Form A More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation,
102 HARv. L. REV. 842, 843.(1989).
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1938 Federal Rules that the states would replicate the Rules, thereby
achieving intra-state and inter-state uniformity, is consistent with the
view that solutions to national problems must originate in the federal
government. As discussed previously, this expectation has not been
realized. Rather than competing as procedural laboratories, 150 the
states should embrace a new federalism of interstate cooperation in
state court rulemaking to achieve the goal of procedural uniformity
throughout the national system of state courts. 151
Limited steps toward procedural uniformity in civil litigation
52
have been taken through the years by the American Law Institute.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") has also tried to "simplif[y] the legal life of businesses
and individuals by providing rules and procedures that are consistent
from state to state."153 As early as 1881, the Alabama State Bar
Association recognized "the legal tangles created by wide variations in
state laws."'1 54 The following year, the New York State legislature
authorized the governor to appoint three commissioners "to explore
the best way to effect uniformity of law between increasingly interdependent states." 155 ALI projects relating to procedural uniformity
include the Restatement of Judgments (1940-1942) and the
Restatement, Second, Judgments (1969-1982), the Restatement,
Second, Conflict of Laws (1971), the Code of Criminal Procedure
(1924-1930), the Model Code of Evidence (1939-1942), a Model Code of

150. Bettman, supra note 32, at 663; Pryor, supra note 31, at 1181 ("[T]he Rehnquist Court
has protected the principle that the states enjoy considerable freedom to compete as laboratories
of social and economic policies."); id. at 1173-74 ("This is the same kind of competition as is
referenced by the more familiar (to lawyers) term, the "laboratory of the states," but it is wider in
scope than that phrase suggests.").
151. See Note, supra note 149, at 863 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 729
(1924)):
In an era in which the once heady and hopeful optimism about the ability of the
federal government to redress social problems has faded and federal budget deficits
loom large, the possibility of informal interstate cooperation is attractive. As Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis noted more than sixty years ago, our polity must resist
the attraction of facile phrases such as "States Rights" or "National Supremacy" and
must not "deny ourselves new or unfamiliar modes in realizing national ideals...
[Our p]olitical thinking must respond [and] bring a fresh ferment of political thought
whereby national aims may be achieved through various forms of political
adjustments."
152. The American Law Institute was incorporated on February 23, 1923. AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 1923-1998 7 (1998).

153. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, About NCCUSL, at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=O&tabid=l1 (last accessed Aug. 26,
2004).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1963-1975) and, most recently, a study
dealing with Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and
Analysis (1984-1994). "Responding to the expanding interstate and
intercourt nature of the practice of law," the NCCUSL drafted the
Uniform Evidence Act 156 as well as the Model Class Actions [Act]
[Rule] (1976), the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 157 the
Uniform Conflict of Laws - Limitations Act (1982), the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (1922), Uniform Audio-Visual Deposition
[Act] [Rule] (1978), and the Model State Administrative Procedures
Act.
158
The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act
"recognizes the interstate aspects of civil litigation and the need to
foster cooperative litigation efforts between the states."'159 Approved
by the NCCUSL in 1962, the act "establishes a mechanism for the
courts of enacting jurisdictions to provide out-of-state tribunals and
litigants with assistance in obtaining discovery and service of
process."'160 Although "relatively few states have enacted the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act," the ALI cites the Act to
"demonstrate the feasibility of interstate cooperation in civil
litigation .... 161
Most recently, a mass tort litigation crisis in state courts 162 has
galvanized state jurists to cooperate in the development of uniform
156. UNIF. R. EVIDENCE ACT (1999):
It may be prudent to anticipate one area of inquiry arising from an earlier mandate
directed to the Drafting Committee that concluded its work with the 1986
amendments adopted at the Boston Conference. Responding to the expanding
interstate and intercourt nature of the practice of law, the Drafting Committee was
charged with bringing the language of the Uniform Rules of Evidence into line with
comparable provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, where reasonably possible.
The underlying theory was, apparently, that a trial practitioner need master only one
set of rules to comfortably practice in both federal and state forums located in various
States, Districts, and Circuits. However, in practice, this theory does not seem to work
as well as expected. In operation, the same words are often construed differently by
different courts, even by sister federal circuits and state jurisdictions. Thus, the
careful lawyer must continue to research certain rules of evidence on a case-by-case
basis.
157. UNIF. R. CRIMINAL P. (1987).

158. 13 U.L.A. 355 (1986).
159. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 108, at 56.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of
Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1992) ("The proliferation of
closely related cases spanning multiple forums, both state and federal, has created serious
problems for the civil litigation process and confronted the judiciary with a management crisis.");
see also COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 108, at 50 ("The growing amount of complex
litigation that is being managed and resolved in state courts has increased drastically the burden
on state judicial systems.").
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strategies including best practices and tentative steps toward uniform
or model rules for complex litigation. In August 1991, the NCCUSL
approved and recommended for enactment the Uniform Transfer of
Litigation Act 16 3 to provide an inter-state court analog to the federal
statute - 28 U.S.C. §1404 - that authorizes the transfer of cases
among federal courts for the convenience of parties and witnesses.
The Reporter for the ALI's Complex Litigation Project proposed a
more ambitious mechanism - an Interstate Complex Litigation Panel
- to facilitate the consolidation of large numbers of related cases. More
finely tuned to address the problem of mass tort litigation
management in state courts, the Reporter's proposal would establish a
system of "mandatory state court consolidation" analogous to the
federal system under the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 164
The National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") launched a
series of "Initiatives in the Management of Mass Torts" which began
in the early 1990s with the establishment of a standing Mass Tort
Litigation Committee of twenty state judges to "craft a national
approach to dealing with mass tort litigation" in state courts. 65
Following a National Mass Tort Conference in 1995, the NCSC
published a set of best practices for state judges in Managing Mass
Tort Cases: A Resource and Reference Book for State Court Judges,
which "served as a primary reference" for the NCSC's online
1 66
Benchbook on Mass Tort Litigation.
The NCSC is currently
developing "model rules and standards of practice" to "improve
' 67
procedural uniformity and management in complex litigation."'
Geographic diversity in the United States does not justify
rampant state court procedural diversity, especially in an era of
increasing nationalization of civil litigation. The states no longer
significantly
reflect
unique
ethnic, cultural,
or historical
characteristics. Professors Rubin and Freely note that America's
"ethnic and cultural differences do not correspond to geographic
sections of the country, and thus cannot be regarded as political

163. 14 U.L.A. 305.
164. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 108, at 229 ('This approach mirrors the
proposed role of the federal Complex Litigation panel in the federal-to-federal and federal-tostate transfer procedures described in § 3.02 and § 4.01.").
165. NCSC Initiatives in Management of Mass Torts, 2 CIVIL ACTION 1, 3 (2003). The NCSC
worked with the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) to set up the CCJ's Mass Tort Litigation
Committee.
166. Id.
167. Id. (noting as one of the four critical functions of the NCSC's National Mass Tort
Clearinghouse the development of "case management strategies and techniques, including model
rules and standardsofpractice .. ")(emphasis added).
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communities... ."168
Professor Carrington's critique of the
proliferation of local rules-that they reflect "differences in the styles
and values of particular groups of judges" rather than "variations in
local conditions" 169-applies equally to the proliferation of variations
in state discovery procedure. There is no cultural or ethnic imperative
that explains why some states adopt numerical limits on admissions
requests while other states do not, or why states adopt different
numerical limits on the same discovery device.
Local political
dynamics within the bench, bar, and legislature, as well as local
custom, may explain procedural variations but do not justify them
normatively. 170 The hodgepodge of discovery reforms adopted by the
states, depicted in Part IV, is a reflection of state court rulemaking
uninformed by empirical experience and not justified by diverse
conditions among the states.
To the extent that material differences among the states may
justify some local procedural variation, the nature and extent of these
differences can be examined through empirical study. However,
certain geographical differences that may affect court operations, such
as varying caseloads in urban versus rural areas, exist within many
states and are not coterminous with state boundaries. Empirical
study might focus on the degree to which problems generated by
crowded court dockets in urban areas across the country are similar
enough to warrant uniform rules targeting those problems or whether
rule amendments-as opposed to "best practices"-offer the most
effective solutions. 171 Also, rather than assuming that procedural
variation must conform to local legal culture, controlled
experimentation may also explore the capacity of local legal cultures
to adjust to uniform procedures.
State courts, through vehicles like the NCSC, are acting in
concert to address their shared needs as state courts that, in many
respects, are different from their federal counterparts. States are
recognizing that federal rules, tailored to the characteristics of federal

168. Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 945 (1994).
169. Carrington, supranote 12, at 946.
170. See Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 784 (arguing that local custom may
explain "why local rules do exist than why they should."); id. at 792 ("[The trends we observe
[relating to local rules in federal court] are all the more disturbing because they are occurring
without careful consideration or as a matter of political compromises unrelated to the goals of a
functioning system.").
171. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Complex Litigation at the Millenium: Ulysses Tied to the
Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 197, 225 (2001) ("Changing the Rules has only limited power to remedy the legitimate
problems with the litigation system.").
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courts, do not necessarily fit the circumstances in which state courts
function. 172 For instance, many resource-poor state judicial systems
have rejected hands-on, labor-intensive, case management techniques
embraced by the federal rules "tailored to a federal system which...
relies on assigned ... judges, and on the availability of
magistrates."' 173 State and federal courts differ in the volume and
nature of their respective caseloads.
Compared with the federal
judiciary, state courts process the vast majority of civil litigation with
fewer resources. 174 Some writers have noted that the different types of
cases handled by state and federal courts may warrant different
procedures 75 while others observe a different legal culture between
76
state and federal courts.

172. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2045 ("If the federal courts see their primary function as
resolving complex disputes, they may tailor their procedures to fit that image; if the state courts
are more concerned with routine cases, they may emphasize limiting, definitional procedural
rules or summary processes with few procedural steps."); id. at 2036-37 (quoting Memorandum
from Standing Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure to Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1983)):
Many states have been reluctant to try to deal with discovery abuse by ad hoc, caseby-case judicial determinations ....
'[T]he federal amendments are tailored to a
federal system, which, unlike Massachusetts, relies on assigned rather than circuit
judges, and on the availability of magistrates.'. . . Massachusetts is by no means the
only replica state to withhold its adoption of the new federal amendments .... Thus,
very little of the population is covered by up-to-date Federal Rules in state court.
See also COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 108, ch. 4 (Consolidation in State Courts), at
4:

[L]itigation in federal courts may not always be the most desirable means of handling
complex litigation. First, as the persistent debate over the preservation of diversity
jurisdiction in the federal courts demonstrates, see 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §

3601 (2d ed. 1984), some believe that federal courts should focus their attention and
resources on those cases that involve federal interests, which federal courts are
uniquely qualified to hear.
173. Subrin, supra note 6, at 2045 (quoting Memorandum from Standing Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2-3 (Dec. 9,
1983)).
174. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS, 1

CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1 (1995), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/
Highlights/vollnol.pdf:
State courts handle the vast majority of the nation's litigation ....State courts
accounted for over 98 percent of [the 90 million cases processed annually by the state
and federal courts from 1984 to 1993]. In 1993, state courts of general jurisdiction
handled 85 times as many criminal cases and 27 times as many civil cases as the U.S.
District Courts, with only 14 times as many judges.
See also Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 598 ("Civil filings in state courts of general jurisdiction
increased by thirty-two percent between 1984 and 1999. In the federal courts, new cases filed
actually decreased in the same time period." (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE OURTS, 1999-2000 14)).

175. See, e.g., Subrin, supranote 6 at 2045 (If the federal courts see their primary function as
resolving complex disputes, they may tailor their procedures to fit that image; if the state courts
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III. THE CASE FOR SYSTEMATIC EMPIRICAL RESEARCH THROUGH
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTATION

Besides procedural disuniformity, another common criticism
leveled at federal discovery reform during the last twenty years is the
lack of empirical research to verify the existence of problems in
discovery practice and to evaluate the efficacy of the spate of reforms,
most of which have retreated from liberal discovery. 177 Equally
deserving of criticism, though largely ignored in the literature, is that
the helter-skelter proliferdition of widely divergent state discovery
rules, demonstrated in Part IV, has also proceeded without benefit of
sound empirical study. Two central theses of this Article are that the
states are already engaged in procedural experimentation increasingly
independent of the disintegrating federal model, and that these
experiments need to be coordinated and harnessed 178 to provide
empirical data that will inform the creation of model uniform rules of
state civil procedure.
Many legal scholars have criticized the dearth of empirical data
to justify, and to evaluate the efficacy of, federal rule changes, 179

are more concerned with routine cases, they may emphasize limiting, definitional procedural
rules or summary processes with few procedural steps."); see also supra note 172.
176. H.M. Kritzer et al., Courts and Litigation Investment: Why Do Lawyers Spend More
Time on Federal Cases?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 7, 15-16 (1984) (also pointing out the potential difference
in legal culture between state and federal courts).
177. Tobias, supra note 10, at 567 ('More proposals for changing the federal rules must be
based on actual experience involving careful experimentation and stringent assessment of
measures' effectiveness with the systematic collection, evaluation, and synthesis of applicable
empirical information.").
178. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 14, at 1582 (proposing that inter-district inconsistency
among federal district court local rules be "harness[ed] and control[ed] ...for the benefit of the
judicial system as a whole.")
179. See, e.g., id. at 1581-82:
[W]e have very busy laboratories, some ninety-four of them, but virtually no one is
collecting data. With a few notable exceptions, results are reported on the basis of
impressions: "We think this is working... the bar seems satisfied, or at least the bar
can live with it."
See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Underlying Assumptions fo the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
841, 841-42 (1993) (advocating a moratorium on rulemaking pending further empirical research
to support the rulemaking process); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
Transformation] ("We need fewer mind experiments and more field experiments, procedural
rules as well as procedural theories that are 'based on experience.' ");
Galanter, supra note 44 at 185:
Improving the civil justice system requires thoughtful, objective analysis based on
sound empirical data. The lack of systematic, cumulative data in this area makes it
possible for far-reaching policy proposals to be advanced on the basis of tendentious
anecdotes and numbers. A bias in which solutions to perceived problems are
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particularly in civil discovery.1 8 0 The CJRA's uncontrolled
experimentation by ninety-four federal district courts has been faulted
as bad science.18 1 Although there have been some notable exceptions
on the federal level-for example, the RAND Institute's evaluation of
case management plans mandated by the CJRA18 2 and the Federal
Judicial Center's empirical study of federal discovery and disclosure
practice under the 1993 Federal Rule amendments, S3--"the debate
over discovery reform has proceeded largely, but not entirely, with
reference to salient personal experiences and not with the benefit of
developed by reference to unusual and atypical cases goes unchallenged. Not
surprisingly, the effects of the resulting policies are often unanticipated.
Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 761, 769-70, 794-800 (1993) (noting the problem of "empirical uncertainty."); Tobias,
supra note 10, at 615:
A special effort should be instituted to evaluate all of those local requirements
receiving experimentation that RAND or the FJC did not assess. For example, the
Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office, the FJC, individual districts, judges,
and advisory groups should assemble, analyze, and synthesize the maximum relevant
empirical data and forward that material to Congress for its consideration and action
in light of the guidance above.
Walker, supra note 36, at 67 (criticizing "the lack of a systematic official plan to collect valid
information about the likely impact of changes to the Rules before the adoption of general
amendments to the Rules"); Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367
(1986) ("Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have been lazy about subjecting their
hunches - which in honesty we should admit are little better than prejudices - to systematic
empirical testing."); see also Sorenson, supra note 45, at 703-04:
[L]ittle empirical research has been done to objectify and quantify discovery abuse...
[C]laims of discovery abuse have rested largely on nonevidence and may well be
generally exaggerated. Frequently the assertions of the extent of discovery abuse do
not rest on evidence, but only cite to another writer making a similar claim or simply
make a conclusory statement that derives its strength from the fact that it has been
repeated so frequently.
180. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Comment on
Walker (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 622 (1994) (noting among the types of rule amendments that
can benefit most from empirical research "amendments aspiring to cause or likely to effect
significant changes in litigant behavior by either altering incentives (as with offer of settlement
rules affecting attorney fee liability) or direct regulation (such as interrogatory limits).")
181. Carrington, supra note 12, at 963:
Insofar as CJRA encourages experimentation, it is congruent with a long-held
ambition of many judges and scholars to employ scientific methods to ascertain what
works in procedure. Alas, there is very little science to be employed in these
experiments. The experiments are uncontrolled; there is no scientific method
employed in planning them; there are ninety-four experiments proceeding at once;
and the experiments were to be completed within three years, long before secondary
or tertiary effects can be experienced and measured. In this respect, the Act is further
confirmation of the disjunction between the politics of court reform and the realities of
what happens in court.
182. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act EvaluationData, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998).
183. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998).
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empirical evidence." 18 4 Judges and practitioners tend to be resistant to
empirical data, frequently "overvalu[ing] anecdotes and opinions
about reform and ...
insufficiently attentive both to social science
process and to the needs of court users." 18 5 Judge Posner has chastised
"[l]awyers, including judges and law professors [for being] lazy about
subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we should admit are little
better than prejudices-to systematic empirical testing."1 8 6 A few
writers blame the legal academy for undervaluing empirical
18 7
scholarship.
184. Judith A McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39
B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998) (summarizing "the state of the legal system's knowledge - and to a
lesser extent, beliefs - about how the federal civil discovery system works."); Walker, supra note
36, at 69 (commenting that "very little empirical study of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
has been conducted" during their first fifty years). For a survey of the impact of available
empirical data on the federal rulemaking process, see McKenna & Wiggins, supra.
185. Chemerinksy & Friedman, supra note 5, at 792; see also Maurice Rosenberg, The
Impact of Procedure-ImpactStudies in the Administration of Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
13, 29 (1988):
[T]his lack of influence [of empirical research on the functioning of procedural rules] is
due to the unreceptiveness of the intended users. Many lawyers and judges appear to
believe that thinking like a lawyer means relying on law books, logic, speculation,
argument, and - when it comes to addressing questions of societal reality - invoking
intuition. They act as if Holmes' epigram about the life of the law being "experience"
should be understood to refer to the random experience of the individual jurist....
Experience in reporting findings to procedural revisers and rulemakers teaches a
sobering lesson: Persuading them to accept empirical research results will be a
formidable task even if the research speaks directly to precisely defined and topical
questions. Data have great trouble piercing made-up minds. Some judges and lawyers
believe there are only two kinds of research findings: those they intuitively agree with
("That's obvious!"); and those they intuitively disagree with ("That's wrong!").
Resistance to the counterintuitive is a formidable barrier to the acceptability of
procedure-impact research findings.
186. Posner, supra note 179, at 367.
187. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 323, 335 (1991):
The law professoriate, as a whole, lacks the necessary training for empirical research
and too often demonstrates something of an ennui toward the actual practice of
law.... But our contributions are as anecdotal and normative as contributions of the
judges and practitioners. ... There needs to be a similar call for empirical work in
judicial rulemaking, and law schools need to respond.
Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in ProceduralRule Making: Comment on Walker, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 595, 612 (1994) (noting the lack of potential sources of empirical research, including
public funding ("prospect of major public funding is remote"), foundations, and university
supported research ("despite recent interest in empirical work in procedure, most legal
academics still tend to shun empirical research")); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment
Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 778 (1998):
An empirical element is intrinsic to much rulemaking, but often it is difficult to
develop an adequate empirical base-a topic that has received increased academic
attention in recent years. As a general matter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have been drafted without the benefit of detailed empirical input.
Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship:Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy
and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 361 (1995) (attributing lack of academic interest in
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Too often, the vacuum left by the absence of empirical data is
partly filled by political influence of the plaintiffs or defense bar on
policymakers, leaving unrepresented the interests of potential
88
litigants who lack direct access to the rulemaking process.
Procedure has become too politicized in recent years'8 9 for empirical
data to be an antidote for special interest group jockeying for tactical
advantage in the rulemaking process. By the late 1980s, the Research
Director of the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, a major
resource for empirical research, commented on the "highly politicized
world of policy research" that "challenges researchers to keep their
political personae separate from their research analytic personae."' 90
Empirical research can, however, temper the dominant influence of
private interests over procedure as demonstrated by the significant

empirical scholarship to lack of training). Burbank, supra note 179, at 1939 n. 80, 1963
(confirming that law professors' "lack of training and inclination" prevents them from conducting
empirical work and, referring to empirical analysis of Rule 11, the need to inform rulemaking
decisions "by experience beyond that of the people making it")
188. See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 455, 464 (1993) (contending that an empirical approach to rulemaking - a
"comprehensive rationality model". .. "would halt the politicization of the rulemaking process"
and would "distinguish Advisory Committee work from legislation"):
[I]n 'unstable environments,' comprehensive rationality is preferred where the
'intended beneficiaries' of regulatory programs 'have little access to political power,
legal advice, and self-help' and, hence, 'are often unable to participate in any agency
proceeding.' The synoptic model is superior because the decisionmaker 'must consider
all interests.' The beneficiaries of civil rulemaking are the actual and potential parties
to future cases - most of whom are unknown at the time of rulemaking - and society
as a whole. A few 'repeat players' may participate in the Advisory Committee
enterprise, but this can be only a handful of the thousands, perhaps millions, of
persons whose interests are directly affected by major changes.
See also Robert G. Bone, supra note 187, at 612 ("Interest groups can provide useful information,
and their participation can serve important process values. But when involvement becomes
control and the dominance of private interest leads to rules seriously out of harmony with the
public interest, there is cause for concern."). But see Mullenix, supra note 59, at 829 ("Yet, there
should be more clear thinking about when such research truly will enhance rule revision.").
189. Concerning the pervasive influence of politics on rulemaking, see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 580-81
(2001) (commenting that the federal civil rules advisory committee recommended the scope
narrowing amendment, despite the lack of an empirical case for the amendment, "largely
because of the political preferences of the leadership of the American College of Trial Lawyers
and the ABA Litigation Section."); see also Mullenix, supra note 59, at 795 (chronicling the
politicization of the federal rulemaking process); Glenn S. Koppel, Politics, Populism and
Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment and the Rulemaking process in California, 24 PEPP.
L. REV. 455, 473 (1997) (focusing on the political battle over the summary judgment statute in
the California legislature); Wiggins, supra note 184, at 789 (discussing the influence of empirical
data on federal rulemaking).
190. Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 56, 65 (1988).
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influence of the Federal Judicial Center's empirical studies on the
federal rulemaking process. 19'
Empirical study also cannot relieve rulemakers of the difficult
task of making hard choices among competing normative goals.
However, "any value system one adopts is more likely to be promoted
if one knows something about the consequences of the choices to be
made."'1 92 For example, in balancing the tension between the
competing procedural goals of judicial efficiency (e.g., speed and low
193
cost) and fairness (e.g., accuracy in factfinding in individual cases),
empirical data can inform rulemakers about whether and to what
extent a proposed rule change will reduce cost and delay and at what
cost to fairness. Discovery reforms designed to cut back the
availability of discovery 194 are premised on the empirically
unsupported, 95 but widely-shared, assumption that discovery is
"abusive, time-consuming, unproductive, and too costly.' ' 96 But the
1998 FJC empirical study of federal court discovery concluded that
"the typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that
are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation, and that discovery
generally-but with notable exceptions-yields information that aids
in the just disposition of cases."' 97 Further, with the exception of the
FJC study, no effort has been made to evaluate whether these
"reforms" in fact, reduce cost and delay in litigation.
Some commentators have proposed harnessing the haphazard
experimentation by federal district courts to realize their potential as

191. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 44, at 230 ("The absence of an adequate knowledge
base... makes lawyers and courts vulnerable to political attacks.... [T]he absence of knowledge
about the legal system provides a setting in which anger can be more easily mobilized politically
and result in misguided policies."); Nard, supra note 187, at 361 (commenting that "decisions
[based on empirical data] are not based on a judge's or legislator's personal bias, but on collective
agreement within the community."); Walker, supra note 36, at 84 (1988) (noting that the "public
interest" would benefit from restricted field experiments of proposed federal rule amendments
before they are promulgated). For an assessment of the substantial impact of the Federal
Judicial Center's empirical research on federal rulemaking, see Thomas E. Willging, Past and
Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1195
(2002)
192. Walker, supra note 188, at 480 (quoting James V. Delong, Defending Cost-Benefit
Analysis, REG., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 39).
193. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way":
Litigation Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 847-48 (noting the "tradeoffs
between fairness and efficiency").
194. See infra Part IV.
195. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 45, at 703-04 (noting lack of empirical support to
substantiate claims of discovery abuse).
196. Willging et al., supra note 183, at 527.
197. Id. at 527.
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laboratories 9 8 for yielding sound empirical data that can inform
national rulemaking. They propose leveraging the potential of the
local rules process through a system of coordinated, controlled field
experiments. 199 Professor Laurens Walker, the most vocal advocate of
a system of "restricted field experiments," criticizes "the lack of a
systematic official plan to collect valid information about the likely
impact of changes to the [Federal] Rules before the adoption of general
200
amendments to the Rules."
The same proposals for a system of controlled experimentation
in the federal court system have equal application to the national
system of state courts. A variety of methods exist for conducting
controlled field experiments by participating states, 20 1 but the
objective of any research design is to isolate the impact of a particular
experimental variable on the behavior of individuals in a relevant
jurisdictions, 20 2 for instance, the impact of a rule mandating initial
198. See Richard Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study: The
Control of PlausibleRival Hypotheses, 1 LAW & S OC REV. 111, 131 (1966):

The United States federal system of government has furnished the experimenter with
50 states which, in the words of the Supreme Court, are "natural laboratories." Legal
sociologists can take advantage of these natural laboratories and... start intensive
investigations of exactly how certain laws influence specific behavioral patterns.
199. See Levin, supra note 14, at 1581-82:
The focus of our attention at this juncture should not be extirpating all inconsistency,
but rather of harnessing and controlling it for the benefit of the judicial system as a
whole. The district court forays speak to underlying problems and inform us of
perceived solutions. We should affirmatively encourage useful experimentation,
controlled experiments, because we need, and want, and can profit from them. One.
might suggest that we can achieve a greater measure of consistency in the long run by
channeling and controlling, rather than fighting to eliminate inconsistency.
See also Willging, supra note 191, at 1197-1203; Tobias, supra note 10, at 618 ("More proposals
for changing the federal rules must be based on actual experience involving careful
experimentation and stringent assessment of measures' effectiveness with the systematic
collection, evaluation, and synthesis of applicable empirical information."); Walker, supra note
36, at 67 ("A program of restricted field experiments should be adopted to predict the impact of
proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Walker, supra note 188, at 488
(calling for a comprehensive reform of federal civil rulemaking). But see Bone, supra note 187, at
595 (noting the limits of empirical research on rulemaking: "I agree with Walker that the federal
rule-making process would benefit from more careful and systematic attention to empirical work.
But Walker's proposal [that would make systematic empirical observation a necessary condition
to federal civil rule making] constrains the rule-making process too much.").
200. Walker, supra note 36, at 67.
201. For a discussion of experimentation as a tool for improving the administration of justice
on the federal level, see E. Alan Lind et al., Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in
the Justice System, in EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 81 (1981). See also Lempert, supra note

198, at 131-32 (Although the state-as-laboratory model is used throughout this article, legal
variations among political subdivisions might also be used for conducting empirical research.).
202. Id. at 111-12; see also Lind et al., supra note 201, at 88:
The design of an evaluation is the overall strategy for extracting information from the
test of a program. Although a great deal of scientific technique and experience has
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disclosure of basic relevant information on the volume and duration of
discovery in civil litigation in state courts. A research design with high
internal validity must control for "plausible rival hypotheses," i.e.,
non-experimental variables "that could reasonably explain the
behavioral change which the investigator would like to be able to
attribute to the existence of the law."20 3 Controlled field experiments,
guided by a national coordinating body, 20 4 would assign proposed
procedural rules to groups of states, controlling for the setting in
20 5
which these procedures are introduced.
A "simple randomized experiment" 20 6 exploring the effect of
initial disclosure on reducing cost and delay in discovery would involve
a comparison of a heterogeneous group of states utilizing an initial
20 7
disclosure rule with a similar group of states not utilizing that rule.
The resulting data would be evaluated, using regression analysis, to
compare of the level of discovery in each group. A more refined
research design would utilize a "before-and-after randomized
experiment" 20 8 in which discovery comparisons between the groups
would be made before, during and after the experimental period.
In a "multi-group randomized experiment," 20 9 various sets of
procedures could be assigned to the experimental states to test how a
particular rule change functions in combination with other
procedures. For example, federal initial disclosure 210 is intended to
function in tandem with a requirement that parties confer to develop a
discovery plan. 211 Sanctions may be imposed on a party who fails to
been developed in this matter, it is important to recognize that there is only one, quite
simple matter that is the goal of all experimental design: to assure that the
comparison upon which an inference of causation may be founded is in fact a sound
comparison.... The object of research design is to construct a study that approaches,
as closely as ethics, practicality, and ingenuity allow, the "all else being equal"
specification needed to infer causality.
203. Lempert, supra note 198, at 112; see also Lind et al., supra note 201, at 89:
The quality of any research design lies in its capacity to eliminate or reduce the
possibility of any explanation of the outcomes observed other than that the program
caused the outcomes. Thus, any design can be assessed by adopting a skeptical frame
of mind and seeking credible rival hypotheses that would explain potential results of
the study without supposing that the results are due to the program.
204. See supra Part V.
205. See Lempert, supra note 198, at 116.
206. See Lind et al., supra note 201, app. B at 92.
207. See Lempert, supra note 198, at 121-22.
208. See Lind et al., supra note 201, app. B at 96
209. Id. at 95-96.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f; see Transcriptof the 'Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 809, 836 (1998):
I do say this about the disclosure, and that is if you are going in the direction I was
advocating, of trying to get the lawyers to manage this stuff, then you do have to put
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cooperate in good faith in developing a discovery plan. 212 By contrast,

Arizona imposes a more aggressive initial disclosure duty that is
broader in scope than the federal rule but without a corresponding
duty on counsel to meet and confer on a discovery plan. 2 13 In

researching the efficacy of initial disclosure procedure, rules that vary
according to the scope of information that must be disclosed could be
assigned to groups of states. Some of these groups could be assigned a
rule imposing a duty to meet and confer with and without a rule
authorizing sanctions on counsel who fail to cooperate in good faith in
fashioning a discovery plan. As an alternative to sanctions, other
states could be assigned a rule that provides parties with incentives to
cooperate, such as conditioning a party's right to seek judicial
214
intervention to resolve discovery disputes on good faith cooperation.
The federal court phenomenon
of widespread
local
experimentation with discovery rules, unguided and uninformed by
sound empirical research, is occurring within the national system of
state courts. The proliferation of diverse state discovery rules has
created fertile soil for empirical evaluation of these reforms to assess
their efficacy. Yet no empirical evaluations have been forthcoming. I
am not aware of any empirical study of recent state discovery reforms
other than those implemented on a pilot basis. In Arizona, one of the
leaders in aggressive discovery reform, no empirical assessment of the
Zlaket Rules has been undertaken during the nine years these rules
have been in effect. 2 15 Colorado has recently implemented on a

some responsibility on them to be forthcoming early on or they never get anywhere. So
you've got to state some kind of a duty to get the conversation going. And that was
really the office of those disclosure requirements.

212. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g).
213. See infra Appendix.
214. Id..

215. See Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 625 (referring to Arizona's drastic reform of its civil
discovery rules, "no statistical confirmation of these premises [underlying the reforms] is
available and no studies have been performed regarding the effect of the rules despite the fact
that the rules have been in effect for more than nine years."); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at

629-30:
The Arizona Supreme Court should attempt to determine exactly how well its
discovery reforms instituted during the 1990s have worked.... The Justices should
carefully assemble, analyze and synthesize the maximum, feasible empirical data
respecting these questions. Minimal empirical data currently exist because the
Arizona Supreme Court has undertaken no formal attempt to study the impacts of the
recent reforms generally, while baselines for comparing the effects of discovery
devices' application have yet to be established specifically.
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statewide basis 2 16 its Simplified Procedure Rules based on only
2 17
sketchy data on the pilot program in two counties.
The role of the several states as "laboratories" for procedural
experimentation 218 can be fully realized through a system of centrally
coordinated controlled experiments informing the development of
model state rules that incorporate innovations empirically proven to
be effective. In Part V, I propose that the states establish a national
mechanism-analogous to the U.S. Judicial Conference-to coordinate
an ongoing process of controlled experimentation in state procedure
and formulation of uniform rules of state civil procedure.
IV. DISCOVERY REFORMS IN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS:
HAPHAZARD EXPERIMENTATION AND PROCEDURAL CHAOS

Part IV takes a close look at recent discovery reforms to
demonstrate graphically the extent to which states are engaging in
robust rules experimentation. This detailed survey of the range and
complexity of discovery rules across jurisdictions is intended to help
the reader appreciate the magnitude of the problem of interstate
disuniformity as well as the rich potential for harnessing this
procedural diversity to improve state procedure.
A. The Discovery Reform "Bandwagon"
Liberal discovery, initiated by the federal courts in 1938, was a
watershed litigation reform aimed at eliminating the element of
21 9
surprise and hide-the-ball tactics common in adversarial litigation.
From 1938 through the 1970, the federal rules were amended to
broaden and expand the availability of discovery and most states-

216. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.1.
217. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 633 (describing the beginning of the implementation
process); COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH, TARGETED BASE REVIEW 2-3:

As part of the pilot program, the Judicial Branch has conducted a study of cases
subject to Rule 1.1; and control group cases not subject to Rule 1.1 in the pilot
locations. The study sought to determine what affect Rule 1.1 had on compliance with
disclosures, case processing times, litigation expenses, and participants' satisfaction
with the Rule 1.1 process.
218. Moskowitz, supra note 12, at 613 (referring to "the changes in the discovery provisions
of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen years" as an illustration in the
procedural arena of Justice Brandeis's characterization of states as "laboratories" in which
experiments in the law might be conducted).
219. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance.Specific Procedure,46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 30 (1994) ('The hide the ball instinct
was central to the "sporting theory of justice" which Dean Roscoe Pound condemned in the first
decade of this century.").
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including California-followed the federal lead. 220 Party-controlled
221
discovery reached its zenith under the federal rules in the 1970s.
Discovery amendments in federal and many state courts since
the 1970s have effected a counter-reformation by curtailing civil
discovery in an attempt "to try to contain the genie of broad discovery
223
without killing it."222 Complaints about a "litigation explosion"
became commonplace and discovery abuse was branded as the
culprit. 224 During this period, defense bar and business groups
became more "aggressive and sophisticated" in lobbying to reduce
access to the courts. 225 One critic of this latter-day discovery reform
movement refers to the series of discovery "reform" amendments as
the "post-1976 pattern of making discovery the convenient scapegoat
226
for generalized complaints about the dispute resolution system."

Another critic has referred to the "pervasive myth of discovery
abuse."

22 7

The 1980
conference as a
federal rules
''proportionality"

federal rules amendments introduced the discovery
tool to facilitate discovery management. The 1983
amendments (1) introduced the concept of
to encourage judges to tailor discovery to the
circumstances of the individual case and gave them sua sponte
authority to do so; (2) required attorneys to certify that they are

220. See Marcus, supra note 187, at 748 ("In a sense, the 1970 amendments to the rules
completed what one could call a cultural cycle in American procedural reform, a cycle that could
be traced back to Pound (and before him to Field), and which was characterized by increased
relaxation and expansion of procedure.").
221. Id. at 749 ("Party-controlled discovery reached its high water mark in the 1970
amendments as far as rule provisions.").
222. Id. at 747.
223. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); see also Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 559, 560 (1992) (describing the proliferation of litigation in the United States); Tobias,
supra note 10, at 570 n.146 (citing, e.g., COMM.ON DISCOVERY, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON
DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 26(b)(1), in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990)); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of
Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992) (discussing the then-proposed amendments to
certain federal discovery rules). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive DiscoveryAbuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1393, 1394 (1994) (documenting "the making and dispersion of... the myth of American
litigiousness and pervasive discovery abuse").
224. Stempel, supra note 93, at 542-43 (describing how, in the public law litigation context,
broad discovery rules were seen as encouraging claims); see also Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R.
King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579,
592 (noting the "widespread criticism in recent years of the undue expense and burden of the
civil discovery process").
225. Id. at 614.
226. Id. at 532.
227. Mullenix, supra note 223, at 1393.
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complying in good faith with the discovery rules; 228 and (3) attempted
to promote judicial discovery management by, in effect, making the
discovery conference mandatory in every case through the
229
requirement that the court hold a pretrial conference.
In 1992, Arizona's dramatic discovery reforms signaled a role
reversal in the relationship between the states and the federal courts
in procedural rulemaking by radically departing from, rather than
merely tinkering with, the federal model of liberal discovery. Arizona's
"Zlaket Rules," in the words of one writer, "turned the adversarial
system of discovery on its head. ''2 30 The Zlaket Rules implemented the
concept of mandatory disclosure in its most drastic form virtually
replacing routine formal discovery. 231 The federal courts followed
Arizona's lead the following year with an attenuated version of
mandatory disclosure and presumptive numerical limits on
232
interrogatories and depositions.

228. Stempel, supra note 93, at 543-552 (chronicling the series of amendments to the federal
rules from 1980 through 2000).
229. Id. at 545:
As a practical matter, the initial pretrial conference required by the 1983 Amendment
to Rule 16(b) became a de facto mandatory discovery conference held in every case
(not only where ordered by the court). The effect was to provide for mandatory
discovery conferences during most of the life of the 1980 amendment, which was
revised substantially as part of the 1993 disclosure amendments.
See also Sorenson, supra note 45, at 701-702 ("[T]he 1983 amendments to Rule 16 on pretrial
scheduling and planning conferences reflected a view that increased judicial management was
needed to address discovery abuse and the amendments were intended to create a mandatory
'process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase, especially motions and
discovery."' (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) advisory committee's note)).
230. Alex Wilson Albright, Introduction to Symposium on Innovations in Discovery, 16 REV.
LITIG. 249, 249 (1997)
231. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (presumptive prohibition of nonparty depositions), (d)
(presumptive deposition duration of four hours); 33.1(a) (presumptive numerical limit of forty
interrogatories); 34(b) (presumptive numerical limit of ten distinct items or categories in
inspection demand); 26(b) (numerical limit of twenty-five admission requests).
232. See Stempel, supra note 93, at 544-56 (chronicling the series of amendments to the
federal rules from 1980 through 2000); see also Jill Schachner Chanen, States Considering
Discovery Reform, 81 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1995):
Despite lingering questions about the efficacy of discovery rules in Arizona
designed to curb abuses and reduce the cost of litigation, the reform movement
marches on.
Arizona led the nation in 1992 when it became the first state to adopt rules
limiting discovery and requiring early, automatic disclosure of relevant information
by parties in lawsuits. The federal courts jumped on board the bandwagon in
December 1993 when similar requirements took effect, but with a provision allowing
courts to opt out of the new rules.
Now Alaska is adopting and Illinois is considering such rules, much to the chagrin
of some lawyers in those states who say the change will strain the attorney-client
relationship by forcing lawyers to disclose damaging information on their own
initiative. Besides those states, at least 15 others have inquired about Arizona's
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In June, 1994, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a set of
discovery reforms that followed the more modest federal disclosure
model, rejecting a more sweeping set of reforms based on the Arizona
In 1995, Colorado followed Arizona's lead by adopting
model.23
comprehensive presumptive limits on discovery methods and early
mandatory disclosure. 234 The state discovery reform movement
gathered momentum in 1996 when Illinois implemented rule
amendments to limit the duration of depositions to three hours 235 and
23 6
to require courts to hold case management conferences in every case.
In cases under $50,000, Illinois rules also provide for sweeping
mandatory disclosure modeled on the Zlaket Rules and presumptively
2 37
limit depositions to parties and expert witnesses.
In 1997, the National Conference of State Trial Judges,
affiliated with the American Bar Association, published a set of
Discovery Guidelines designed to integrate the disparate elements of
discovery reform into a coherent pretrial system.
In 1999, Texas instituted a three-track system of differential
The
discovery limits denominated "discovery control plans. ' ' 23 8
following year, the federal rules were amended again to scale back the
scope of discovery from "subject matter" relevance to "claim or
defense" relevance and by presumptively limiting the duration of each
239
deposition to one seven-hour day.
As depicted in detail in Part IV, many other states have
implemented discovery reforms in a kaleidoscopic variety of
combinations, picking and choosing from a wide range of discovery
initiatives borrowed from the federal model or from one of the states
just mentioned. This survey illustrates the degree to which state
procedure has fragmented in an area where procedural differences can
have major substantive effects. The various discovery regimes, which

discovery rules, said Arizona Supreme Court Justice Thomas Zlaket, who chaired the
court's rules committee that endorsed the discovery reforms.
But whether Arizona's rule changes have had the desired effect of reducing costs,
curbing discovery abuses and increasing civility among lawyers remains to be seen.
233. Peggy E. Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation 45-47 (Hastings C. of Law
Pub. Law Research Inst., Working Paper Series, 1995).
234. Initial mandatory disclosures are due thirty days after the case is at issue. COLO. R. CIV.
P. 26(a)(1). See also Albright, supra note 222, at 250 (noting that both Colorado and Arizona have
adopted rules requiring mandatory disclosure).
235. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 206(d), 222(f) (2).
236. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a).
237. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(f) (2).
238. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.
239. Stempel, supra note 93, at 550-51 (describing the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1)).
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complicate the increasing volume of national litigation in state courts,
have not been justified by systematic empirical research.
B. Lawyer-Managed Discovery vs. Court-ManagedDiscovery
The discovery reforms reviewed in Part IV fall into two
categories: those that address "lawyer-managed" discovery (Section C)
and those that address "court-managed" discovery (Section D).240
Lawyer-managed discovery refers to "ordinary" discovery that is
controlled by the parties and is available without court intervention.
Court-managed discovery requires court intervention, either
permitting discovery beyond presumed limits or imposing limits
tailored to the individual case.
Recent discovery amendments to the federal rules of civil
procedure were premised on the concept of a three-phase discovery
process. Phase I involves automatic disclosure of information without
the necessity of discovery requests. Formal discovery initiated by
attorneys without court supervision, known as "lawyer-managed"
discovery, occurs during Phase II. Rules designed to guide or regulate
lawyer-managed discovery include (1) default "rules of the road"rule-based presumptive limits on scope and volume of discovery that
define "core" discovery-and (2) the requirement that counsel meet
and confer outside of court to plan discovery. Phase III-courtmanaged discovery-is reserved for difficult cases in which the parties
seek discovery in excess of the rule-based limits but cannot agree upon
241
the extent of such discovery.
C. Lawyer-Managed Discovery: Litigation "Rules of the Road"
1. Rule-Based Presumptive Limits: Across-the-Board or Differentiated
by Case Category
Some jurisdictions have imposed across-the-board presumptive
limits on the scope of discovery and presumptive limits on discovery
duration. Most jurisdictions have imposed across-the-board limits on
the frequency and extent of use of discovery methods (i.e., "volume
limits"). A few jurisdictions, like California and Texas, have imposed

240. Id. at 552 (describing the distinction between "lawyer-managed" and "court-managed"
discovery).
241. Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 524 (1998) (the Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
explains the three-level discovery process).
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volume limits that vary according to the type of case, establishing
"tracks" or "plans" that categorize cases according to the size of the
case, usually defined by the amount in controversy. California's socalled "three-track" system is an example of case-differentiated
presumptive limits. Section L.a first surveys rules that presumptively
limit scope and Section 1.b reviews rules that presumptively limit the
volume of discovery.
Critics of across-the-board discovery limits have argued that
"one-size-fits-all" rules do not target the minority of high-stakes,
242
complex cases where discovery problems most frequently arise.
According to one writer, such rules "change the rules in those very
243
situations that should be left alone."
a. Presumptive Limits Narrowing the "Scope"of Discovery:
In 2000, amended Federal Rule 26(b)(1) narrowed the scope of
routine discovery "available as of right to attorneys without court
authorization" from matters "relevant to the subject matter" to matters
"relevant to the claim or defense of any party."244 Discovery of
information under the broader "relevant to the subject matter"
245
standard requires a showing of good cause, or party stipulation.
Therefore, if the responding party objects to a discovery request on
grounds that it calls for information not relevant to a claim or defense,
the requesting party must move to compel production. The requesting
party may then argue that the request does meet the "claim or
242. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39
B.C. L. REV. 683, 686 (1998) ("If complex litigation is the source of more problematic discovery
practice, then rule reform ought to be tailored to the universe of this particular litigation that
inspires complaint."); see also Chanen, supra note 232, at 20:
Another concern is that limits on depositions, interrogatories or other kinds of
discovery may not be workable for all kinds of lawsuits. As a result, opponents argue,
lawyers will be forced to run to court for approval to stray from the rules, increasing
litigation costs.
"We are ... critical of one-size-fits-all discovery," said Steve Tomashefsky, a
lawyer with Jenner & Block in Chicago and president of the reform-minded Chicago
Council of Lawyers. "Some of the Illinois rules are an attempt to put all discovery
rules into a fairly narrow straightjacket. In general, our approach has been that
discovery should be worked out according to a plan, supervised by a judge, not by
some arbitrary rules."
243. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving The "Haves" A Little More: Considering The 1998
Discovery Proposals,52 SMU L. REV. 229, 259 (1999)
244. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2008 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2003);

see also Stotler Memorandum, in 181 F.R.D. 18, 33 (1999) ("The scope of routine discovery is
narrowed in some measure.").
245. See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Nov. 12-13, 1998 ("[T]he present full
scope of discovery remains available, as all matters relevant to the subject matter of the
litigation, either when the parties agree or when a recalcitrant party is overruled by the court.").
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defense" standard and, if not, that good cause exists for discovery
246
under the "relevant to the subject matter" standard.
While acknowledging that the line between "claims and
defenses" relevance and "subject matter" relevance is imprecise, the
advisory committee drew this distinction to send two signals: (1) to the
federal trial court-"that it has the authority to confine discovery to
the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings"-and (2) to the
parties-"that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new
claims or defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings." 247
Most states have refused to follow the federal lead in this area
of discovery reform. 248 Only six states have adopted rules that narrow
scope definition: Arkansas ("relevant to the issues in the pending
action") 249; Mississippi ("relevant to the issues raised by claims or
defenses") 250 ; Colorado, 25 1 Connecticut, 252 and Oregon 253 ("relevant to
claim or defense of any party"); and New York ("material and
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action"). 254 Even Texas,
which recently overhauled its discovery rules, rejected scope
255
narrowing.
b. Presumptive Limits on Frequency and Extent of Use of Discovery
Methods in Federal and State Courts: Theme and Variations
Most jurisdictions, including California and the federal courts,
impose some form of rule-based limits on discovery volume. Out of a
total of fifty-two jurisdictions, including the federal courts and the
District of Columbia, the rules of procedure in thirty-four of these

246. Rule 26(b)(1) committee note, in 192 F.R.D. 340, 389 (2001):
Under the amended provisions, if there is an objection that discovery goes beyond
material relevant to the parties' claims or defenses, the court would become involved
to determine whether the discovery is relevant to the claims or defenses and, if not,
whether good cause exists for authorizing it so long as it is relevant to the subject
matter of the action.
247. Id.
248. See infraAppendix.
249. ARK. R. CIV. P. 26.
250. MIss. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
251. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("relevant to the claim or defense of any party").
252. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 13-2 ("material to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, which are not privileged, whether the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party").
253. OR. R. Civ. P. 36(B)(1).
254. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(a) (McKinney 2004).
255. See Kenneth E. Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates &
Compromises, 20 REV. LITIG. 89, 101 (2000) (describing the Texas Supreme Court's compromises
in adopting a new rule).
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jurisdictions impose some form of volume limits in general jurisdiction
cases.
Of these thirty-four jurisdictions, thirty impose across-theboard volume limits that apply in general jurisdiction courts to all
cases without regard to case type or amount in controversy. Many
states have special rules that limit discovery in trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. Some states-like Texas, Illinois, and California-have
adopted a system of discovery limits that varies by case track. The
following analysis of volume limits proceeds in two parts. Subsection i
surveys-by individual discovery method-those jurisdictions that
limit the volume of discovery. Subsection ii focuses on selected
jurisdictions that impose volume limits on a case-differentiated basis.
i.

Volume limits by Individual Discovery Method-Variations:

Interrogatories
More jurisdictions impose limits on interrogatories than any
other discovery method. Thirty-three out of fifty-two jurisdictions
impose some form of numerical limit on interrogatories. 256 A majority
of these thirty-three jurisdictions-twenty-eight in number-impose
across-the-board presumptive limits on interrogatories. 257
The
remaining five jurisdictions (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Texas,
and Kentucky) impose numerical limits on interrogatories that vary
according to case tracks. 25 8 Of these five jurisdictions, Connecticut
imposes volume limits only on so-called Expedited Process Track
Cases involving damages less than $75,000.259 The other four states
impose interrogatory limitations in all cases, but impose more
restrictive volume limits on small cases, generally defined by amount
in controversy. For example, California, in "limited cases" (i.e., cases
under $25,000), restricts the total number of interrogatories,
admissions, and document requests to a "grab-bag"260 of thirty-five
and, in "unlimited cases" (i.e., cases over $25,000), limits the total
number of interrogatories to thirty-five and the total number of
admission requests to thirty-five. Texas, another "three-track" state,
256. Of the thirty-four jurisdictions that impose some form of volume limit, only Oregon does
not limit interrogatories, choosing to limit only admission requests. See infra Appendix.
257. Federal courts, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
258. See infra Appendix.
259. See infra Appendix.
260. See ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE

BEFORE TRIAL § 8:1810, at 8L-1 (2001).
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limits interrogatories to twenty-five in cases assigned to Level 1 and
26 1
Level 2 Discovery Control Plans.
Colorado recently adopted an optional Simplified Procedure
rule for cases not exceeding $100,000 effective July 1, 2004. Designed
to provide "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil
actions," Rule 16.1 essentially replaces most formal discovery with
early and far-reaching disclosure. 262 Parties may elect to be excluded
from this Simplified Procedure.
Of the thirty-three jurisdictions that limit interrogatories,
fifteen confine volume limits solely to interrogatories.263 Of these
thirty-three jurisdictions, another fifteen combine limits on
interrogatories with numerical limits on oral depositions as well. 264
However, three of the fifteen jurisdictions that restrict the availability
of depositions-California, 265 Connecticut 266 and Kentucky 267-- confine
deposition limits only to economic litigation track cases, reducing to
twelve the number of jurisdictions that combine numerical limits on
depositions with numerical limits on interrogatories in substantial
cases. All jurisdictions that restrict deposition availability also
268
numerically limit interrogatories.
Finally, three jurisdictions-Iowa, Nevada, and South
Carolina-confine their volume limits to a combination of limits on
interrogatories and admission requests. 269 California joins these three
states if one considers only "unlimited" (non-economic) cases.
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2(c)(3), 190.3(c)(3).
262. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16. 1(a)(2):
This Rule normally requires early, full disclosure of persons, documents, damages,
insurance and experts, and early, detailed disclosure of witnesses' testimony, whose
direct trial testimony is then generally limited to that which has been disclosed.
Normally, no depositions, interrogatories, document requests or requests for
admission are allowed, although examination under C.R.C.P. 34 (a) (2) and 35 is
permitted.
263. Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia.
See infra Appendix.
264. Federal courts, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
Although California limits the number of depositions to one in limited cases (cases under
$25,000), I did not include California among these twelve jurisdictions because there are no
limits to the availability of oral depositions in unlimited cases (over $25,000).
265. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 94 (discovery rules under section confined to economic litigation
for "limited civil cases").
266. CONN. R. SUPER CT. Civ. § 23-6 (in expedited process cases "[d]epositions may be taken,
but only of parties to the action.)
267. Ky. R. Civ. P. 93.01 (describing depositions in the "special rules of the circuit court for
the economic litigation docket").
268. See infra Appendix.
269. Id.
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Numerical limits on interrogatories also vary by jurisdiction,
ranging from twenty-five in federal court, 270 Texas 271 and Utah, 272 to
sixty in Hawaii. 273 The most popular numerical limit is thirty adopted
in fifteen states. 274 Four jurisdictions-Arizona, 275 the District of
Columbia, 276 Idaho, 277 and Nevada 27 8 -fix their numerical limit at
27 9 Minnesota, 280 Montana, 28 1
forty and seven jurisdictions-Michigan,
Nebraska, 28 2 New Hampshire, 28 3 New Mexico, 28 4 and North
Carolina 2 8 5 -set their limits at fifty interrogatories. By comparison,
28 6
California's limit of thirty-five interrogatories in unlimited cases
falls within the mainstream of jurisdictions. However, California's
presumptive limit can be exceeded by attaching a Declaration of
Necessity 28 7 which requires the opposing side to move for a protective
order. In federal court, and most jurisdictions that presumptively
limit interrogatories, the requesting party can exceed the limits only
by leave of court and only "to the extent consistent with the
288
[proportionality] principles of Rule 26(b)(2)."
Depositions
The oral deposition ranks second in order of discovery devices
subject to presumptive limits with fifteen jurisdictions restricting
28 9
their availability (twelve if only non-economic cases are considered).
There are a variety of ways in which these jurisdictions have
270. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
271. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2(c)(3).
272. UTAH R. CIV. P. 33(a).

273. See infra Appendix.
274. Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See
infra Appendix.
275. See infra Appendix.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(c).
287. § 2030(c)(3).
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).

289. California, Connecticut and Kentucky confine depositions limits to economic litigation.
See infra Appendix.
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narrowed the frequency and extent of use of oral depositions,
employing various combinations of limits on number of individual
depositions, limits on the aggregate number of deposition hours and
limits on duration of individual depositions. 290 Some jurisdictionslike Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Texas-limit only the number of
depositions or the number of aggregate deposition hours,29 1 while
others-like Maine, Oklahoma and Illinois-limit only the duration of
individual depositions. 292 Still other judicial systems limit both the
number and duration of oral depositions, like the federal courts,
293
Alaska and Arizona.
Arizona imposes the most restrictive numerical limits,
presumptively barring nonparty depositions (other than experts and
document custodians). 294 Alaska and Colorado are next in line,
presumptively limiting depositions to three in number, followed by the
federal courts, the District of Columbia, Utah, and Wyoming which
presumptively limit depositions to ten. 295 In terms of duration, Illinois

imposes the shortest presumptive limit of three hours. 296 Alaska
restricts depositions of parties and experts to six hours and other
depositions to three hours. 297 Arizona imposes a four-hour limit,
followed by Oklahoma and Texas (six hours), the federal courts, and
298
the District of Columbia (seven hours) and Maine (eight hours).
Request for Admissions
Requests to admit rank third in order of discovery devices
subject to volume limits. Nine states (including California) have
299
imposed presumptive limits on admissions requests.

290. See infra Appendix.
291. Id.
292. Id. In cases under $50,000, Illinois also limits oral depositions to parties, testifying
treating physicians, and "opinion" witnesses. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(0(2).
293. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (ten depositions per side), 30(d)(2) (each deposition limited to
one seven-hour day); ALASKA R. Crv. P. 30(a)(2) (three depositions per side), 30(d)(2) (each
deposition limited to three hours; six hours to depose parties, independent experts, and treating
physicians); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (presumptive prohibition of nonparty depositions, other than
experts and document custodians), 30(d) (deposition duration limited to four hours).
294. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
295. See infra Appendix.
296. Id.
297. Id..
298. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(a); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(d); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2); ME. R.
Civ. P. 30(d)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3230(A)(3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.5(c).
299. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut (in expedited process cases under $75,000),
Iowa, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Carolina. ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 33.1(a); CAL. CIV. PROC.
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Across-the-board numerical limits on admissions requests
range from twenty in Colorado and South Carolina to forty in
Nevada. 300 Within this range fall Arizona (twenty-five), Florida, Iowa,
Oklahoma and Oregon (thirty) and California (thirty-five in unlimited
civil cases). 30 1 Connecticut bars admissions requests completely, but
only in Expedited Process Cases under $75,000.302
Of the twelve jurisdictions that place across-the-board
presumptive limits on oral depositions and interrogatories, only

three-Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma-also limit requests to
admit. 303 These states are the "heavy-hitters" of volume limits.
Oregon, on the other end of the spectrum, is the only state that
confines its volume limits solely to admissions requests. 30 4
Document Requests
The FJC's empirical study of federal civil discovery found that
the most frequent form of discovery activity was document
production. 30 5 The FJC study also found that the highest percentage
of attorneys reported problems in their cases with document
production. 30 6 Though reputed to be "one of the most costly parts of
discovery and.

. .

fraught with difficulties," 30 7 document requests are

presumptively limited across-the-board in only two states-Arizona
(ten distinct items or categories) 308 and Colorado (twenty inspection
demands) 3 9-which have implemented the most far-reaching set of
CODE §§ 2030(c), 2033(c); COLO. R. C[V. P. 26(b)(2); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 23-6; IOWA R. CrV.
P. 1.510(1); NEV. R. CIV. P. 36(C); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3236; S.C. R. CrV. P. 36(C).
300. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); NEV. R. CIV. P. 36(C); S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(C).
301. ARIZ. R. CrV. P. 33.1(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2030(c), 2033(c); FLA. R. CrV. P.
1.370(a); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.510(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3236; OR. R. CIV. P. 45(F).
302. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 23-6.
303. See infra Appendix.
304. OR. R. CIV. P. 45(f).
305. Willging et al., supra note 183, at 544 ("Document production is the most frequent form
of discovery, reported by 84% of attorneys who used some discovery or disclosure in their case,
followed closely by interrogatories (81%).").
306. Id. at 540.
307. Id.:
The most frequently reported problems with document production were failure to
respond adequately... and failure to respond in a timely fashion .... Those
representing plaintiffs were more likely to complain that a party failed to respond
adequately, while those representing defendants were more likely to complain that
requests were vague or sought an excessive number of documents. Problems with
document production were more likely to occur in high stakes, complex, or contentious
cases, but a significant number of problems also occur in noncomplex, noncontentions, and low-stakes cases.
308. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
309. COLO. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2).
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discovery reforms. California presumptively limits document requests
only in limited civil cases as part of the "grab-bag rule of 35."310
Connecticut places numerical limits on inspection demands in

Expedited Process Track Cases under

$75,000.311

ii. Volume Limits on a Case-Differentiated Basis-Variations:
Each of the five jurisdictions that vary volume limits by case
category has rules that streamline discovery for low-stakes, economic
litigation, cases.
Of these five jurisdictions, four-California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, and Texas-define these cases by
amount-in-controversy.
Of these four jurisdictions, California's
amount-in-controversy cut-off is the lowest by a margin of $25,000 to
$50,000. Kentucky's Economic Litigation Docket includes specified
3 12
classes of cases regardlessof amount in controversy.
California
California's three tracks consist of small claims, limited and
unlimited cases. In small claims cases (cases under $5,000), discovery
is barred; in "limited civil cases" (under $25,000), discovery is limited
to one deposition and a combination of thirty-five interrogatories,
document requests and admission requests. 313 In "unlimited cases,"
3 14
discovery is limited to thirty-five specially prepared interrogatories
3 15
and thirty-five admission requests.
Connecticut
In Connecticut, discovery in Expedited Process Track Cases
(under $75,000) is limited to official form interrogatories and
inspection demands and party depositions (excluding non-party
Admission requests are completely excluded. 316
depositions).
Connecticut imposes no discovery limits in non-expedited cases.
Illinois

310. WEIL & BROWN, supra 260, § 8:1810, at 8L-1.
311. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 23-6.

312. Ky. R. Civ. P. 89.
313. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 94(a).

314. § 2030(c).
315. § 2033(c)(1).
316. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § § 23-6, 13-6(c).
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Illinois utilizes a two-track system of discovery limits which
imposes across-the-board presumptive limits, applicable in all cases,
on interrogatories (thirty)317 and on deposition duration (three hours
per deposition).31 8 In cases under $50,000, additional limits are
imposed on depositions of parties, treating physicians and "opinion"
31 9
witnesses.
Kentucky
Kentucky's Economic Litigation Docket presumptively permits
only parties to be deposed 320 and limits the number of interrogatories
to twenty. 321 In all other cases, Kentucky imposes a presumptive
322
numerical limit on interrogatories of thirty.
Texas
Texas employs a three-track system of presumptive "discovery
control plans." Every case must be governed by one of three discovery
control plans denominated as Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3.323
Cases pleading damages under $50,000 are governed by the
Level 1 discovery control plan which imposes the most restrictive
presumptive limits: a maximum of six deposition hours per party
within which to examine and cross-examine witnesses (which may be
extended up to ten hours by stipulation) and a limit of twenty-five
interrogatories. 324 Similar to California's "limited case," Level 1 is
intended to provide plaintiffs filing modest cases with a "safe haven"
from excessive discovery by defendants. 325
Unlike California,
however, Texas does not require plaintiffs with smaller cases to utilize
326
Level 1 if they desire broader discovery.

317. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(c), 222(0(1).
318. R. 206(d), 222(f)(2).
319. R. 222(f)(2)(a)-(b).
320. KY. R. Civ. P. 93.91.
321. KY. R. Civ. P. 93.02.
322. Ky. R. Civ. P. 33.01(3).
323. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.
324. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2.
325. HON. NATHAN L. HECHT & ROBERT H. PEMBERTON, A GUIDE TO THE 1999 TEXAS
DISCOVERY RULES REVISIONS G-8 (Nov. 18, 1998) ("Level 1 is expressly designed as a 'safe haven'
enabling plaintiffs with smaller cases to avoid being overtaxed by their opponent's discovery."),
available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/tdr/disccle37.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
326. Id.
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Level 2 is the "basic 'default' discovery track intended to govern
most cases. ' 32 7 Depositions in Level 2 are limited to fifty hours per
party, and only parties and expert witnesses may be deposed.
Interrogatories are restricted to twenty-five. The Level 2 Discovery
328
Plan also imposes a discovery period cut-off.
Level 3 regulates court-managed discovery... "designed for
more complex cases that would not easily fit into the framework of
Levels I or 2."329 Level 3 discovery proceeds under a court-ordered
discovery plan tailored to the individual case. 330 A Level 3 discovery
plan may incorporate a process of phased discovery. 33 1 Texas's threetrack system is flexible, allowing parties in a Level 1 case to stipulate
to Level 2 discovery and allowing either party in a Level 1 plan to
move the court for an individually-tailored discovery control plan
under Level 3. The court may also act, sua sponte, to order an
individually tailored Level 3 discovery control plan. 332
c. Presumptive Limits on Discovery Duration:Discovery Cut-Offs
In addition to presumptive limits on scope and frequency of
discovery, several jurisdictions have attempted to reduce cost and
delay by shortening the amount of time available for discovery, i.e.,
presumptive discovery cut-offs.
California imposes a time limit to complete discovery of thirty
days before the date initially set for trial.333 The court has the
discretion to extend the discovery period or to reopen discovery upon

327. Id.
328. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1):
All discovery must be conducted during the discovery period, which begins when suit
is filed and continues until: . . . (B) in (cases not arising under the Family Code], the
earlier of (i) 30 days before the date set for trial, or (ii) nine months after the earlier of
the date of the first oral deposition or the due date of the first response to written
discovery.
329. Hecht & Pemberton, supra note 325, at G-9.
330. A Level 3 court-ordered discovery plan must include, inter alia: (1) a trial date or a date
for a conference to set the trial date, (2) a discovery cut-off date either for the entire case or for
discreet phases of discovery, and (3) volume limits. TEX. R. CIv. P. 190.4(b)(1)-(4).
331. TEX. R. CIv. P. 190.4(b)(2); see also TEX. R. CIv. P. 190.4(b)(2) comment to 1999 change,
legislative note 1 ("Separate Level 3 plans for phases of the case may be appropriate.").
332. One year into the operation of the 1999 Texas discovery rules, it was observed that "in
urban jurisdictions and in larger cases, courts are tending to enter their own Level 3 discovery
plans or parties are seeking entry of such orders by agreement." ROBERT H. PEMBERTON, RULES
ATTORNEY, SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, THE FIRST YEAR UNDER THE NEW DISCOVERY RULES: THE
BIG ISSUES THUS FAR 5 (2000), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/
tdr/disclyr.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
333. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2024(a) (also requires discovery motions be heard no later than
the fifteenth day before the date initially set for trial.).
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motion accompanied by a "declaration stating facts showing a
reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each
issue presented by the motion." 334 However, because CCP §2924's
discovery time limit is expressed as an "entitlement as of right" to
complete discovery up to the thirty-days-before-trial cut-off date, the
trial judge is effectively denied discretion to impose a more restrictive
discovery time limit suited to the needs of the individual case.
Several states set earlier time limits for discovery than
California. Illinois prescribes a presumptive discovery completion
deadline of sixty days before commencement of trial, 335 Colorado's
Presumptive Case Management Order establishes a presumptive
discovery deadline of fifty days before the beginning of trial, 336 and
Nevada's Rule 26(1) mandates completion of discovery forty-five days
33 7
before trial.
Two states-New Jersey 33 8 and Utah 3 39-set fixed presumptive
time limits for discovery completion that run forward from a point
earlier in the lawsuit (i.e., filing of the first answer or after the first
defendant is served) rather than running backward from the date set
for the commencement of trial. Texas and New Jersey mandate
different discovery time limits for different discovery tracks. 340 Texas'
system of discovery tracks combines presumptive time limits with
volume limits.
New Jersey has a four-track case management system which
imposes the following discovery completion deadlines counting from
the date the first answer is filed or from 90 days after the first
defendant is served, whichever occurs first: Track I -150 days; Track
11-300 days; Tracks III and IV-450 days.3 4 1 Parties may consent to
extend the time for discovery for an additional 60 days and may move
the court for additional time for good cause shown. 342
Under Texas's rules, the Level 1 Discovery Control Plan
requires completion of discovery thirty days before trial, like
California. 343 However, Level 2's default discovery control plan
imposes a presumptive discovery completion deadline of nine months
334. § 2024(e).
335. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218.

336. COLO. R. CIv. P. 16(b)
337. NEV. R. Civ. P. 26(1).

338. N.J. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. 4:24-1(a).
339. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(d) (discovery to be completed within 240 days after the first answer
is filed, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court).
340. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.1-190.3; N.J. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. 4:24-1(A).
341. N.J. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. 4:24-1(a).

342. N.J. R. SUPER. CT. Civ. 4:24-1(c).
343. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2.
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commencing from the date of the first deposition or due date of the
first written discovery request served in the case. 344 The Level 3
Discovery Control Plan, designed for complex cases that require courtmanaged discovery, requires the judge to set discovery time limits for
345
the entire case or for an appropriate phase of it.
The District of Columbia requires the court, after an initial
scheduling conference, to "place the case on one of several alternative
time tracks and [to] enter a scheduling conference order which will set
346
dates for future events in the case" including discovery deadlines.
Maine's Rule 16 requires the automatic entry of a standard
form scheduling order that includes a discovery completion
deadline.3 47 In complex cases, the rule permits customized scheduling
and pretrial orders on motion by a party or the court.
The federal rules advisory committee declined to recommend
348
an early discovery cut-off amendment.
2. Mandatory Disclosure: Theme and Variations
Mandatory disclosure, as distinguished from formal discovery,
imposes a duty to exchange specific categories of information without
waiting for discovery requests. 349 Early disclosure, as originally
conceived by Judge William Schwarzer and Magistrate Wayne Brazil,
was intended as an antidote to excessive adversarial sparring by
lawyers over formal discovery requests. 350

344. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3.
345. TEX. R. CIv. P. 190.4.
346. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 16(b).
347. ME. R. Civ. P. 16 & advisory committee's note (1999).
348. For a summary of the grounds for rejecting early discovery cutoffs, see Richard L.
Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World
Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 178-79 (1999) (conflicting empirical finds regarding the
impact of early discovery cutoffs on reducing cost and delay and noting that early discovery
cutoffs required setting early trial dates, which is impractical in courts with crowded dockets;
concluding a one-size-fits-all discovery cut-off date "would not work").
349. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note (1993) ("[T]his subdivision imposes
on parties a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic
information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about
settlement.").
350. The concept of mandatory disclosure has its roots in the law review articles written by
federal bench officers Wayne D. Brazil and William W. Schwarzer. See Kuo-Chang Huang,
Mandatory Disclosure:A ControversialDevice With No Effects, 21 PACE L. REV. 203, 209 (2000):
The two authors also played an important role in implementing this idea in the 1993
FRCP amendments. These two authors, Wayne D. Brazil and William W. Schwarzer,
challenged the appropriateness of the adversary nature of the pretrial process and
advocated to transform it into a non-adversary system. These ideas formed the basic
philosophical foundation of their mandatory disclosure proposals.
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Only nine jurisdictions have embraced comprehensive
disclosure procedures-the federal judiciary, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, Texas, and Utah.3 5 1 California
could arguably be considered the tenth jurisdiction because its case
questionnaire procedure, applicable only in limited cases, 352 is
essentially a form of optional disclosure. California's procedure is
similar to Texas's Request for Disclosure, 353 which is also limited to
small-stakes cases. With the exception of Arizona, most disclosure
requirements fall far short of Judge Schwarzer's ambitious goal.
In 1992, Arizona seized the initiative from federal rule-makers
by implementing the first-and most ambitious 3 54-version
of
mandatory disclosure3 55 accompanied by severe limitations on formal
discovery. 356 In 1993, 357 Federal Rule 26(a) implemented a diluted
version of mandatory disclosure. 3 58
In response to intense and
widespread opposition, 359 the Federal Rule was amended in 2000 to
limit disclosure to information supporting the claims and defenses of
the disclosing party.

351. These eight jurisdictions do not include states that require disclosure of specified
documents. See, e.g., New York, which requires disclosure of accident reports, and South
Carolina, which requires disclosure of relevant medical statements or records if a pre-trial
hearing is held. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(g) (McKinney 2004); S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
352. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 93.
353. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.1, 194.2.
354. Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 306 (1994) ("The Supreme Court of Arizona took the idea its full length,
substantially replacing its discovery practice with a disclosure practice.").
355. Anthony R. Lucia, The Creation and Evolution of Disclosure in Arizona, 16 REV. LITIG.
255, 255, 257-58 (1997).
356. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30.
357. Prior to the 1993 federal rules amendment adopting mandatory disclosure, several
district courts implemented variations on mandatory disclosure under the Civil Justice Reform
Act. See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Derailingthe Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1, 33.
358. See Lucia, supra note 355, at 262 ("In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended to establish a more limited form of disclosure than that adopted in Arizona.").
359. See Marcus, supra note 348, at 170:
[T]he controversy over the adoption of mandatory initial disclosure in 1993 was
probably the most vigorous in the history of the Federal Rules. Although opponents
had a variety of grounds for opposing the addition of this new requirement, a constant
refrain was the belief of many lawyers that forcing them to reveal harmful
information without a formal discovery request, contravened the credo of the advocate
in America. Opposition to mandatory disclosure was not limited to corporate
defendants.
See also Sorenson, supra note 45, at 687 ("Opposition to the disclosure rule has come from all
quarters-the organized bar, individual practitioners, legal scholars, and some judges-and has
been motivated by politics, pragmatism, and fundamental theory."); Tobias, supra note 10, at 575
("No formal rule amendment has received so much criticism from such a broad spectrum of
federal court users.").
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Mandatory disclosure typically encompasses three categories of
information: (1) basic relevant information other than trial witnesses
and documentary evidence, typically denominated "initialdisclosures;"
(2) information relating to expert trial testimony; and (3) other trial
evidence, including lay witness testimony and documentary evidence,
called "pretrialdisclosures". Under the federal rules, disclosure of
each of these categories of basic information proceeds in three
successive stages: (1) initial disclosures to be completed during the
first few months after defendant is served and has appeared, 360 (2)
disclosure of expert testimony at least ninety days before trial,361 and
362
(3) disclosure of other trial evidence at least thirty days before trial.
Alaska, Colorado, and Utah emulate the federal three-phase
363
mandatory disclosure process.
Departing from the federal approach, Arizona collapses
disclosures into a single initial disclosure requirement which
mandates that all disclosures be made within forty days of the filing of
the answer, subject to a continuing duty to disclose "whenever new
information is discovered or revealed." 364 Similarly, Illinois requires
the disclosure of all information falling within the scope of the duty to
disclose, including information relating to expert testimony, within
120 days after the answer is filed.3 65 Texas's Request for Disclosure,
which can be served up to thirty days before the end of the discovery
period, likewise encompasses expert witness information along with
witness statements and a statement of the legal theories and factual
366
bases of the responding party's claims and defenses.
Subsections a. and b. review the variety of approaches to initial
disclosures and disclosure of expert testimony.
a. FourModels of Initial Disclosures
Federal and state jurisdictions have experimented with four
distinct models of initial disclosure.
360. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require initial disclosures to be completed at or
within fourteen days of the Rule 26(f) discovery planning conference unless otherwise stipulated
or ordered by the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1). Rule 26(f) provides that the parties confer "as
soon as practicable and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is held or a
scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b). Rule 16(b) requires the scheduling order to issue "as
soon as practicable but in any event within 90 days after the appearance of a defendant and
within 120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant."
361. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
362. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(3).
363. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 26(a); COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
364. ARIz. R. CIV. P. 26.1.
365. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(a) and (d).

366. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2.
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i.Federal Rule 26(a)(1): Mandatory; narrow scope; case exemptions
Rule 26(a)(1) imposes a narrowly focused duty to disclose
witnesses and documents "that the disclosing party intends to support
its claims or defenses," 367 as well damage computations 368 and
insurance agreements. 369 Because mandatory disclosure may not be
suitable for all cases 37 0 -for example, "big" cases 3 71-the rule exempts
372
certain categories of cases deemed unsuited to initial disclosure,
permits the parties to waive the requirement by stipulation, 373 and
authorizes the court to modify or eliminate disclosure obligations in a
particular case. 374 To facilitate discovery planning and management
by counsel, initial disclosures must be made at, or within fourteen
days of, the Rule 26(f) conference at which the parties must discuss
settlement and attempt to agree on a discovery plan.3 7 5 Rule 26(a)(1)
requires parties to make initial disclosures based on "information then
reasonably available to it"376 and expressly declines to excuse a party
from its disclosure duty based on the failure of another party to make
its disclosures. 377 The rule also defers formal discovery until the
367. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A) ("[Tihe name and, if known, the address and telephone
number of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may
use to support its claims or defenses") and (B) ("a copy of, or a description by category and
location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things ... that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses.
368. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B)
369. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
370. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) committee notes (1993), in 146 F.R.D. at 629 ("The disclosure
obligations specified in paragraph (1) will not be appropriate for all cases, and it is expected that
changes in these obligations will be made by the court or parties when the circumstances
warrant.").
371. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, in 181 F.R.D. 24, 32
(1998):

It does not seem useful to draft a rule that exempts 'big discovery' or 'problem
discovery' cases. The resolution is to allow the parties to stipulate that there is to be
no initial disclosure, or to allow any party to object during the Rule 26(f) conference
that disclosure is not appropriate.
372. FED. R. CIV.P. 26(a)(1)(E).
373. Carrington, supra note 354, at 307 ("The rulemakers also recognized that the disclosure
requirement might be unsuitable to some cases. Thus, it is provided that the requirement may be
waived by the parties or dissolved by order of the court.").
374. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(1).
375. Initial disclosures are linked to the Rule 26(f) conference in order to facilitate discovery
planning and management by counsel. See Paul D. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change
Discovery Rules: Advice for Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 456,
460 (2000) (noting that Rule 26(a)(1)'s early initial disclosure requirement "was introduced into
the rules in 1993 as a device for enabling lawyers to plan and to manage discovery").
376. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
377. Id.
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parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f) 378 which can
effectively bar parties from engaging in formal discovery for as long as
three months from defendant's appearance or four months after
37 9
service of the complaint.
3
8
0
Both Colorado and Utah 381 model their mandatory disclosure
rules after the federal rules.
Nevada's mandatory disclosure
requirement is somewhat broader in scope than the federal model,
encompassing the identity of all persons with information relevant to
the allegations of any pleading, whether or not the information
38 2
supports the disclosing party's claims or defenses.
ii. Arizona: Mandatory; broad scope; no case exemptions
Arizona's disclosure rule is far more ambitious in scope and
applicability than the federal version. Arizona imposes a broad duty
to disclose core information in writing-through a disclosure
statement-and promptly-within forty days after the filing of a
responsive pleading. Parties must disclose the factual basis and legal
theory underlying each claim or defense, the identity of all persons
with relevant information (whether helpful or harmful to the
disclosing party), the "nature of the knowledge or information each
such individual is believed to possess," and a list of documents that
may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.3 83 Disclosure in
Arizona does not proceed in stages; therefore, the disclosure statement
must also include information relating to both lay and expert trial
witnesses. 384
Arizona also imposes a continuing duty to make
amended or additional disclosures "whenever new or different
information is discovered or revealed." 385 To put teeth into the
disclosure requirements, 386 the disclosure rules provide for the
378. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). Colorado defers discovery until submission by counsel of the case
management order "which normally occurs 45 days after the case is at issue." David R. DeMuro,
Colorado's Approach to Discovery and Pretrial Reform in Civil Cases, 16 REV. LIT. 271, 286
(1997). Utah follows federal rule 26(d). Id.
379. A pretrial conference is discretionary with the judge who must, nevertheless, issue a
scheduling order "as soon as practicable but in any event within 90 days after the appearance of
a defendant and within 120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R.
CiV. P. 16(a), (b).
380. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (Initial disclosures must occur earlier than under federal rules,
i.e., "[n]o later than 30 days after the case is at issue").
381. UTAH R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

NEV. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
ARIZ. ST. R.C.P.R. 26. 1(A)(1), (2), (4).
ARIz. ST. R.C.P.R. 26.1(A)(6).
ARIZ. ST. R.C.P.R. 26.1(b)(2).
Bryan v. Riddell, 875 P.2d 131, 135 (Ariz. 1994).
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mandatory exclusion as trial evidence of information that was not
timely disclosed. 38 7 Like the federal rules, Arizona's mandatory
evidence exclusion sanction provides an exception for harmless failure
to disclose. 38 8
Unlike the federal rules, Arizona's disclosure rules apply
Arizona also
across-the-board to all cases without exemptions.
38 9
imposes an affirmative duty of reasonable inquiry and investigation
that is, on its face, more onerous than the duty imposed under the
federal rules to make initial disclosures "based on the information
then reasonably available to [the disclosing party]."390 However,
federal Rule 26(g)(1), in effect, imposes an affirmative duty of
reasonable inquiry by requiring each disclosure to be signed by an
attorney of record which constitutes a certification that "to the best of
the signer's knowledge. . . , formed after a reasonable inquiry, the
39 1
disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made."
A comparison of presumptive limits imposed by Arizona and
the Federal Rules indicates the extent to which Arizona's disclosure
rules have displaced formal discovery. In Arizona, oral depositions are
presumptively limited to party and expert witnesses, thus excluding
non-party lay witnesses unless all parties otherwise stipulate, upon
court order for good cause shown, or following a Comprehensive
Pretrial Conference.3 92 By contrast, the federal rules permit non-party
depositions, 393 but set a numerical limit of ten oral depositions per
395
side.3 94 Arizona limits the length of depositions to four hours
compared with seven hours under the federal rules. 396 Arizona
presumptively limits document production requests to a maximum of
"ten distinct items or categories of items" which can be exceeded by
party stipulation or court order for good cause shown; the federal rules
387. ARIZ. R.C.P.R. 37(c)(1).
388. Id. ("[U]nless such failure [to timely disclose information] is harmless"); cf. FED. R. Civ.
P. 37(c) ("A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information (as required]
is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial ...any witness or
information not so disclosed.").
389. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(b)(3) ("All disclosures shall include information and data in the
possession, custody and control of the parties as well as that which can be ascertained, learned
or acquired by reasonable inquiry and investigation.").
390. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
391. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1) (emphasis added).
392. ARIz. R. CIv. P. 30(a).
393. FED. R. CLV. P. 30(a)(1) ("A party may take the testimony of any person, including a
party, by deposition upon oral examination . .
394. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(a)(2)(A).
395. ARIZ. R. CIV .P.30(d).
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) ("Unless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the
parties, a deposition is limited to one day of seven hours.").
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impose no limitation on document production. Arizona presumptively
limits admission requests to twenty-five; 97 the federal rules do not
limit the number of admission requests. Interrogatories are the only
discovery device in which the federal rules' presumptive limit399
twenty-five 39 8-exceeds Arizona's limit of exceeds.
Alaska's disclosure requirement-which includes the factual
bases of claims and defenses and the identity of persons and
400
documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity,"
both favorable and unfavorable to the disclosing party's case-is more
sweeping in scope than the federal model but less comprehensive than
Arizona's.
iii. Illinois: Mandatory; broad scope; limited to cases under $50,000
Illinois adopted mandatory disclosure provisions that are
almost identical to Arizona's in scope but, unlike Arizona's model, are
limited in application to cases not exceeding $50,000 in damages. 40 1
Like Arizona's disclosure rules, Illinois imposes a continuing duty of
disclosure "whenever new or different information or documents
become known to the disclosing party" and an affirmative duty of
"reasonable inquiry and investigation. 4 02
As a tradeoff to expansive mandatory disclosure, Illinois also
imposes presumptive limits on discovery that are more restrictive
than those set by the federal rules but which are not quite as
restrictive as Arizona's. Whereas Arizona presumptively limits oral
depositions to parties and expert trial witnesses in all cases,40 3 Illinois
limits oral depositions in cases under $50,000 to parties, treating
physicians and expert trial witnesses and presumptively prohibits socalled "evidence depositions" unless a good cause showing is made that
the witness will likely be unavailable for trial or other exceptional
circumstances exist. 40 4 Illinois also prescribes presumptive limits on
interrogatories (thirty compared with forty in Arizona) 40 5 and
deposition duration (three hour limit per depositions compared with

397. ARIz. R. CIV .P. 36(b).
398. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
399. ARiz. R. CIV .P. 33.1(a).
400. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
401. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 222 (a), (d). Illinois' disclosure deadline - 120 days after the answer is
filed - is later than Arizona's deadline of 40 days after the answer is filed. ILL. SUP. CT. R.222(c).
402. ILL. SUP. CT. R.222(c).
403. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
404. ILL. SUP. CT.R. 222(a), (f)(2).
405. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(c), 222(f)(1).
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four hours in Arizona). 40 6 As in Arizona, these limits apply to all cases,
not just to cases under $50,000. Unlike Arizona, Illinois' rules do not
limit the availability of admission or document requests.
Kentucky's mandatory disclosure rules are applicable to
Economic Litigation Cases defined by type of case rather than amount
40 7
in controversy.
iv. Texas: Optional; broad scope; no case exemptions
40 8
Texas rejected the federal model of mandatory disclosure,
opting instead for "standardized requests for basic discoverable
information that would be presumptively unobjectionable" 40 9 and
available in all cases. Mandatory disclosure was opposed by both the
plaintiff and defense bars4 10 primarily because it would impose
4 11
discovery costs on cases that typically do not use discovery.
Rule 194.2, as promulgated in 1998, struck a compromise
between plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. Responding to the
plaintiffs' attorneys' concerns over the breadth of the disclosure
obligation, the final version narrowed the scope of the request to
require "the legal theories and, in general, the factual bases of the
responding party's claims or defenses" adding, in parentheses, "the
responding party need not marshal all evidence that may be offered at
trial."41 2 Rule 194.2 also broadened the scope of the request to include,
inter alia, the identity of "persons having knowledge of relevant facts,
and a brief statement of each identified person's connection with the
case" as well as request for witness statements, which are not
protected by Texas's work product rule.
Texas's disclosure rule lies somewhere between the federal and
Arizona models. Although Texas rejected the mandatory feature of
disclosure embraced by both the federal and Arizona rules, the Texas
disclosure request is broader in scope than the federal mandatory
disclosure duty, approaching that of Arizona's disclosure statement.
Unlike federal disclosure, Arizona's disclosure statement and Texas's

406. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 206(d), 222(f)(2).

407. KY. R. CIv. P. 89 (contracts, personal injury, property damages, property rights and
termination of parental rights).
408. See Kenneth E. Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates &
Compromises, 20 REV. LITIG. 89, 159 (2000) ('The Discovery Task Force, the CRC [State Bar of
Texas Court Rules Committee], and the SCAC [Supreme Court Advisory Committee] all rejected
the Federal Rules' notion of mandatory disclosure.").
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2.
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disclosure request both include legal theories and factual bases of the
responding party's claims or defenses, as well as identity.of persons
with knowledge of relevant information, both favorable and
unfavorable. In one significant respect, the Texas disclosure requestby omitting identification of relevant documents-is narrower in scope
than both federal mandatory disclosure and Arizona's disclosure
statement
b. Expert Witness Disclosure
i.

Mandatory Expert Witness Disclosure in Federal Court

The federal rules implement one of the most comprehensive
expert witness disclosure schemes designed to reduce the number of
costly expert witness depositions and to help parties prepare for those
expert depositions that are conducted. 413 Federal Rule 26(a)(2)
requires "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the
basis and reasons therefor," the "data or other information considered
by the witness in forming the opinions," and "any exhibits to be used
as a summary of or support for the opinions." 4 14 Instead of a brief
narrative statement of the qualifications of each expert, the Federal
Rule requires detailed disclosure of "all publications authored by the
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which
the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within
415
the preceding four years."
ii. Expert Witness Disclosure in State Jurisdictions
Colorado, 418
Arizona, 41 7
states-Alaska,416
seven
Only
Connecticut, 41 9 Kansas, 420 Maine, 421 and Utah 422-have
adopted
mandatory disclosure of expert witnesses. Most of the remaining
states provide for optional disclosure through interrogatories and oral

413. Advisory committee's note, 146 F.R.D. 535, 634 (1993).
414. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

415.
416.
417.
418.

Id.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
ARIz. R. CIv. P. 26.1.
COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).

419. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 13-4 (4).

420. KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60-226(b)(6).
421. ME. R. CIV. P. 16.
422. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
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Alaska, 424 Colorado 42 5 and Utah 426 follow the federal

model that requires the expert to prepare and sign a detailed report.
The content of Alaska's and Colorado's expert report is the same as
that required by the federal disclosure rule. Utah's expert report is
slightly less detailed and omits the federal disclosure requirements of
"the data or other information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions" and "any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support
for the opinions." 427 Arizona's expert disclosure requirement is similar
to Utah's but requires less detailed information about the expert's
qualifications. 428
Disclosure procedure in both Connecticut and
Kansas omits all reference to the expert's qualifications.
Maine
requires "an automatic disclosure of expert witness information
required by M.R.Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i)" 429 which copies the former
federal discovery rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)-now superseded by the more
comprehensive federal disclosure of expert witness informationauthorizing the optional use of specified interrogatories directed to
expert testimony.
In contrast with the eight jurisdictions that have implemented
mandatory expert witness disclosure, California, through its optional
procedure, provides very limited expert trial witness information,
430
placing the burden on oral depositions to flesh out the details.
The deadline for completing expert witness disclosure varies
among the seven mandatory disclosure state jurisdictions. Arizona
requires the earliest disclosure of expert information, which is part of
the "initial disclosure" to be made within 40 days after the answer is
filed, 431 followed by Colorado (120 days before the trial date),432 Utah
423. See infra Appendix.
424. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)
425. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)
426. UTAH R. CIv. P. 26(a)(3).
427. Compare UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3) ("[T]he subject matter on which the expert is expected
to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a
summary of the grounds for each opinion"), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), ALASKA R. CIV. P.
26(a)(2) and COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) ("[A] complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions .... ").
428. Arizona merely requires the disclosure of "the qualifications of the witness and the
name and address of the custodian of copies of any reports prepared by the expert." ARIZ. R. CIV.
P. 26.1(a)(6).
429. ME. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1999).
430. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(f)(2)(D) ("[The expert witness] declaration.., shall
contain ....... (D) A representation that the expert will be sufficiently familiar with the pending
action to submit to a meaningful oral deposition concerning the specific testimony, including any
opinion and its basis, that the expert is expected to give at trial.").
431. ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 26.1(b).
432. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(I).
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(30 days after expiration of "fact discovery" 433 which must be
completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed), and Kansas
434
(at least 90 days before trial unless otherwise directed by the court).
Connecticut rules require disclosure within "a reasonable time prior to
trial."435 In Alaska 4 36 and Maine, 437 the court sets the deadline.
Among the states that authorize formal discovery of expert witness
information, Illinois requires the court to set deadlines for disclosure
of opinion witnesses and their opinions, through interrogatory
answers, sufficiently early to assure completion of oral depositions
more than sixty days before trial. 438
Under the federal rules,
mandatory expert disclosure must be made ninety days before trial
439
unless otherwise directed by the court.
3. Discovery Planning by Counsel
Nineteen jurisdictions, including federal court, have adopted a
variety of rules that either require, or utilize incentives to encourage,
counsel to confer on crafting discovery plans tailored to the needs of
the individual case. 440 Such rules are designed to relieve courts of the
burden of convening discovery conferences in every case. 441 As
discussed below, some of these jurisdictions require judicial follow-up

433. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(C).
434. KAN. R. CIV. P. § 60-226(b)(6).
435. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. § 13-4(4).
436. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
437. ME. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
438. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(c):
All dates set for the disclosure of witnesses, including rebuttal witnesses, and the
completion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure that discovery will be completed not
later than 60 days before the date on which the trial court reasonably anticipates that
trial will commence, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
Id. committee notes ("For example, opinion witnesses should be disclosed, and their opinions set
forth pursuant to interrogatory answer, at such time or times as will permit their depositions to
be taken more than 60 days before trial.").
439. FED. R. CrV. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
440. The federal courts, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Maryland, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
441. Carrington, supra note 375, at 463. Presumptive limits are supposed to facilitate
discovery planning by providing counsel with the litigation rules-of-the-road. To exceed these
limits, the parties must submit to the court a discovery plan for additional - customized discovery. See Niemeyer, supra note 241, at 524 (discussing customized discovery); see also
Carrington, supra note 375, at 464 ("[A]s an aid to parties and counsel in planning, a state's
rules might provide some presumptive parameters to be extended by agreement whenever good
cause is shown.").
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through the entry of scheduling orders, 442 while others contemplate
44 3
judicial intervention only where the parties cannot agree.

a. Mandatory Discovery Plans Automatically Entered by the Court:
StandardPretrialScheduling Orders
Some jurisdictions mandate discovery planning by the parties
in every case without burdening the courts with routine hands-on
discovery management duties.
Colorado's Presumptive Case Management Order prescribes a
pre-trial schedule that sets deadlines for disclosure, settlement
discussions and discovery and requires the parties to meet and confer
to discuss the need for a Modified Case Management Order. 444 Maine's
Rule 16 also provides for a standard pre-trial scheduling order
automatically entered by the court, but subject to modification by
445
court order.
b. Mandatory Discovery Plans Submitted to the Court for Approval
446 Alaska,4 47
Mandatory discovery planning in federal court,
Nevada, 448 and Utah 449 requires the parties to confer on discovery
matters and to submit a proposed discovery plan to the court, in the
form of a "report," for incorporation into a scheduling order. The court
may, but is not required to, convene a discovery conference before
450
entering the scheduling order.
The Federal Rules provide a well-developed mechanism for
discovery planning. Federal Rule 26(f) requires the parties to "confer"

442. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
443. See, e.g., NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.1 (providing for court intervention through a "dispute
resolution conference" only on party motion or sua sponte.)
444. COLO. R. Civ. P. 16b(10) (discovery to commence forty-five days after case is at issue and
must be completed fifty days before the trial date)
445. ME. R. CIV. P. 16 (standard pre-trial scheduling order includes an eight-month discovery
completion deadline).
446. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

447. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(f), 16.
448. See NEV. R. CIv. P. 16.1 ("Within thirty (30) days after each case conference, the parties
must file a joint case conference report or, if the parties are unable to agree upon the contents of
a joint report ....).
449. UTAH. R. CIV. P. 26().
450. The District of Columbia rules require the parties to meet three weeks before a
mandatory pre-trial conference, but does not specify developing a proposed discovery plan among
the matters to be considered. D.C. R. Civ. P. 16(c). The parties must submit a joint pre-trial
statement one week prior to the pre-trial conference. D.C. R. CIV. P. 16(e).
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as soon as practicable to develop a proposed discovery plan 451 and
specifies in detail the contents of the discovery plan. 452 Cases exempt
from initial disclosure are likewise exempt from the requirements of
Rule 26(f). Although Federal Rule 16(b) requires the court, in each
case, to enter a scheduling order, the federal scheme eases the
discovery management burden on judges in two ways. First, the court
is not required to convene a case management conference. Second, the
parties must attempt "in good faith" to agree on a discovery plan that
becomes the basis for the court's scheduling order. 453 A party or a
party's attorney who "fails to participate in good faith in the
development and submission of a proposed discovery plan" is subject
454
to sanctions at the court's discretion.
To reinforce the key role of the Rule 26(f) conference as a
"discovery planning event," 455 federal Rule 26(d) defers formal
discovery until the parties have conferred. 456 The Advisory Committee

451. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) ("[Tlhe parties must, as soon as practicable and in any event at
least 21 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due ....confer to...
develop a proposed discovery plan ....).
452. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). The discovery plan should
indicate the parties' views and proposals concerning: (1) what changes should be made
in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Rule 26(a), including a
statement as to when disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) were made or will be made; (2)
the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed,
and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon
particular issues; (3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery
imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be
imposed; and (4) any other orders that should be entered by the court under Rule 26(c)
or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The parties must submit to the court a "written report outlining the plan." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f).
453. See advisory committee's note to 1993 Amendments to Rule 26, 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 36 (2d ed. 1994):

The revised rule directs that in all cases not exempted by local rule or special order
the litigants must meet in person and plan for discovery. Following this meeting, the
parties submit to the court their proposals for a discovery plan and can begin formal
discovery. Their report will assist the court in seeing that the timing and scope of
disclosures under revised Rule 26(a) and the limitations on the extent of discovery
under these rules and local rules are tailored to the circumstances of the particular
case.
454. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(g).
455. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1998), in 181 F.R.D. 24, 34 ('This

moratorium continues to be desirable despite the narrowing of initial disclosure requirements.
The moratorium not only ensures that disclosure is not superseded by earlier discovery, butand perhaps more important-also preserves the role of the Rule 26(f) conference as a discoveryplanning event.").
456. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).
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pronounced the Rule 26(f) conference "one of the most successful
45 7
changes made in the 1993 amendments."
c.

Optional Discovery PlanningEncouraged Through Incentives

As an alternative to mandatory discovery planning, the District
of Columbia and seventeen states-Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming-have adopted
rules that encourage, but do not expressly require, counsel to engage in
discovery planning. To motivate counsel to plan discovery, all but two
of these jurisdictions-North Carolina and the District of
Columbia 45 8 - require the court to convene a scheduling or discovery
conference if the moving party represents that the parties have been
unable, in good faith, to agree on a discovery plan 459 and (except in
Maryland) submits a proposed discovery plan. 460 In addition, all but

457. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note on 2000 amendments. "The Committee
has been informed that the addition of the conference was one of the most successful changes
made in the 1993 amendments, and it therefore has determined to apply the conference
requirement nationwide." Id.
458. In North Carolina and the District of Columbia, the court may, but is not required to,
convene a discovery conference on a party's motion that included a proposed plan and schedule of
discovery and a statement that the movant has made reasonable effort to reach agreement with
opposing counsel. N.C. GEN. STAT. § la-1, Rule 26(f); D.C. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
459. MD. R. 2-401(c) (parties "encouraged to reach agreement on a plan for the scheduling
and completion of discovery"), 2-504.1:
When Required. In any of the following circumstances, the court shall issue an order
requiring the parties to attend a scheduling conference:... (3) in an action, in which a
party requests a scheduling conference and represents that, despite a good faith effort,
the parties have been unable to reach an agreement (i) on a plan for the scheduling
and completion of discovery ....
460. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(f); HAw. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (duty to participate in good faith in
framing a discovery plan if proposed by any party; court must convene discovery conference if
requesting party submits a proposed discovery plan and schedule and certifies to reasonable
effort to agree); IOWA CT. R. 1.507(1); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06 (requiring the court to convene a
discovery conference if the party's motion includes, inter alia, "(b) A proposed plan and schedule
of discovery; ... (e) A statement showing that the attorney making the motion has made a
reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the
motion"); Miss. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (court may convene discovery conference and must do so if
requested by a party, but only if request certifies that counsel has "conferred, or made a
reasonable effort to confer, with opposing counsel" and "shall include: 1. a statement of the issues
to be tried; 2. a plan and schedule of discovery; 3. limitations to be placed on discovery, if any;
and 4. other proposed orders with respect to discovery."); MONT. R. CIV. P. 26(f); N.D. R. CIV. P.
26(f) (requiring the court to convene a discovery conference if the party's motion includes, inter
alia, "(2) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;... [and] (5) A statement showing that the
attorney making the motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing
attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion."); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-026(f) (court may
convene discovery conference sua sponte and must do so on motion if motion includes, inter alia,
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two of these eighteen jurisdictions (New Mexico and Maryland), as
well as Nevada, impose a duty on parties or their attorneys to
participate in good faith in framing a discovery plan and authorize the
46 1
court to sanction counsel who violate that duty.
d. Court-MediatedDiscovery Planning:Illinois
Illinois mandates discovery planning in court but without the
benefit of a prior meeting by the parties outside of court. Of all the
variations on the theme of discovery planning, Illinois' scheme places
46 2
the greatest burden on the courts.

e. Meet and Confer/Discovery Planningunder Current California
Rules
California Rule of Court 212(f) requires parties to meet and
confer out-of-court, but the rule places less emphasis on the meeting
as a discovery planning event than federal Rule 26(f) in several ways.
First, Rule 212(f) does not require the parties to develop a discovery
plan but merely encourages them to "consider" setting a discovery

a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; attorneys obligated to participate in good faith in
framing of discovery plan, but only if a plan is proposed by attorney for any party); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 3226(f) (requiring the court to convene a discovery conference if the party's motion
includes, inter alia, "2. A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;... [and] 5. A statement
showing that the attorney making the motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement
with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion."); S.C. R. CIv. P. 26(f) (mandatory
discovery conference only if motion includes a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; purpose
of discovery conference is to "prevent discovery abuse by encouraging the court to intervene when
abuse occurs, or when attorney has failed to obtain the cooperation of opposing counsel...
Routine matters should be resolved by Rule 26 (c) Motions"); TENN. R. CIv. P. 26.06 (court may
convene a discovery conference and must do so pursuant to motion that includes, inter alia, a
proposed plan and schedule of discovery); VT. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (court must convene discovery
conference only if motion includes, inter alia,a proposed plan and schedule of discovery); WASH.
SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(f) (court must convene discovery conference if motion includes, inter alia,a
proposed plan and schedule of discovery); W. VA. R. CIv. P. 26(f); WYO. R. CiV. P. 26(f) (court must
convene discovery conference if motion by party includes, inter alia, a plan and schedule of
discovery).
461. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 26(f) ("Each party and each party's attorney are under a duty
to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the
attorney for any party."); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 26(g); HAW. R. CIv. P. 26(f); IOWA CT. R.
1.507(2); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06; MiSS. R. Civ. P. 26(c) & 37(e); MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(f); NEV. R. Civ.
P. 26(f) (authorizing sanctions for counsel who fail or refuse to engage in framing a discovery
plan); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 26(f)(5) & 37(g); N.D. R. CIv. P. 26(f); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 3226(F) & 3237(F); S.C. R. CIv. P. 26(f) & 37(e); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.06 & 37.05; VT. R. Civ. P.
26(f) & 37(e); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(f) & 37(e); W. VA. R. CIv. P. 26(f); WYO. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
& 37(e).
462. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (mandating that court participate in discovery plan).
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schedule. 46 3 By contrast, federal Rule 26(f) requires the parties to
develop a comprehensive proposed discovery plan that addresses
timing and form of disclosures and timing and scope of discovery
requests (including phased discovery and limiting discovery to
particular issues). Second, California rules do not suspend discovery
pending the meet and confer by which time some or most discovery
may have already occurred. 464 Under federal practice, all discovery is
deferred until the parties have conferred and developed a discovery
plan which governs all discovery in the case. Thus, the federal meetand-confer rule channels the attention of the parties to discovery
planning rather than discovery completion and anticipation and
resolution of discovery issues,465 as under Rule 212(f).
D. Court-ManagedDiscovery
Section D briefly surveys reforms that promote court-managed
discovery through direct court intervention to tailor discovery to the
circumstances of the individual case.
Federal and state court rules governing court-managed
discovery employ various combinations of optional or mandatory
scheduling orders, in-court discovery conferences that focus
exclusively on discovery management, and pretrial scheduling or case
management conferences that touch more casually on discovery as
only one of several pretrial events. Additionally, some jurisdictions
embrace the proportionality principle, which explicitly confers judicial
discretion to weigh the burdens and benefits of discovery on an ad hoc
basis.
The Federal Rules give judges considerable authority to control
discovery in individual cases, including setting deadlines for
completion of discovery. 466 Federal judges frequently impose discovery
time limits as a discovery management tool. 46 7 State courts, however,

463. CAL. R. CT. 212(f) ("Unless the court orders another time period, no later than 30
calendar days before the date set for the case management conference, the parties must meet
and confer, in person or by telephone, to consider each of the issues identified in (e) and, in
addition, to consider the following: (1) Resolving any discovery disputes and setting a discovery
schedule ...").
464. Topics to be considered at the meet and confer include "[w]hether discovery has been
completed and, if not, the date by which it will be completed." CAL. R. CT. 212(e)(8).
465. CAL. R. CT. 212(f) (parties to consider, inter alia, "(1) Resolving any discovery disputes").
466. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) ("[Tjhe district judge ....shall ....enter a scheduling order that
limits the time ...(3) to complete discovery.").
467. See Willging, supra note 183, at 580:
Of the instances in which attorneys reported some court involvement in discovery or
disclosure, the court imposed time limits on the completion of discovery in 80% of
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may be less receptive to routine judicial involvement in discovery
matters that may unacceptably tax scarce judicial resources. 46 8 State
judges labor under heavier caseloads than their federal counterparts
without the support of magistrates to share the discovery
management burden. Also, in master calendar jurisdictions where, as
in many California trial courts, judges are not assigned cases for all
purposes, the effectiveness of discovery management may be impaired
by the judge's lack of familiarity with the case.
Rules governing scheduling orders, discovery conferences, and
pre-trial, case management or scheduling conferences vary
considerably across the nation. Fifteen states do not have procedures
that explicitly address judicial management of discovery. 469 Nineteen
states have adopted rules that authorize, but do not generally require,
courts to enter orders limiting discovery. 4 70 In some of these states,
such orders are required only if the court decides to convene a
conference dealing with discovery. 471 Among the nineteen states
472
where scheduling orders are generally optional, twelve-Arizona,
Iowa, 473

4 75
Montana, 476 New
Minnesota, 474 Mississippi,

Mexico,

477

those instances. The median time limit imposed by the court was six months; 75% of
the limits were shorter than eight months and 25% were four months or less.
468. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., NCSC Annual Report 2002 3 ("Like other branches of
government, courts are faced with massive budget shortfalls while simultaneously confronting
the need to expend more resources on security and improve operations to better serve the
(last
public."), available at www.ncsconline.orglD-Comm/Images/NCSCAnnlRpt2002.pdf.
visited Aug. 6, 2004).
469. Arkansas, Connecticut (required only in Expedited Process Track Cases), Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky (mandatory discovery conference only in Economic Litigation Docket Cases),
Massachusetts (optional pre-trial conference but not a tool for discovery scheduling or planning),
Missouri (optional pre-trial conference but not a tool for discovery scheduling or planning),
Nebraska, New Jersey (only presumptive cut-offs by track), New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island (optional pre-trial conference but not a tool for discovery scheduling
or planning), and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix.
470. ALA. R. Civ. P. 16(b); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(b); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.200(a); KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60216(b) (West 2004); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1551 (West 2004); MISs. R. CIv. P. 26(c); NEV.
R. Civ. P. 16.1(d); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-016b; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, R. 26(f) & (fi); N.D. R.
Civ. P. 26(f),16(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3226F (West 2004); S.C. R. CIv. P. 26(a); S.D. R. CIV.
P. § 15-6-16; TENN. R. CIv. P. 16.01; TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4; VT. R. CIV. P. 26(f); VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:13;
WASH R. SUPER. CT. CIV. P. 26(f); WYO. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3).

471. See, e.g., KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60-216(b) (West 2004), LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1551,
MISs. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
472. ARIZ. R. Civ .P. 16(a) (pre-trial conference at court's discretion); 16(b) ("comprehensive"
pre-trial conference mandatory upon written request of any party).
473. IOWA R. CIv. P. 1.507(1) (discovery conference within court's discretion or a party's
request).
474. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06 (Court may convene discovery conference; must do so upon
motion by any party).
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Oklahoma, 478
South
Carolina, 479
Tennessee, 48 0
Vermont, 48 1
4
8
2
4
8
3
Washington,
and Wyoming -require
the court to convene a
discovery conference only when requested by parties who cannot agree
upon a discovery plan. Of these 12 states, New Mexico, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming require the
motion to be accompanied by a proposed discovery plan.
Scheduling orders are mandatory, with or without discovery or
pre-trial conferences, in eighteen jurisdictions. 48 4 In five of these475. Miss. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (Court may hold "discovery conference" and must do so if requested
by any party; court may impose sanctions "for the failure of a party or counsel without good
cause to have cooperated in the framing of an appropriate discovery plan by agreement.").
476. MONT. R. Civ. P. 26() (Court may convene a "discovery conference" and must do so on
motion by any party.); 16(b) (Court must enter a "scheduling order" that, inter alia, limits the
time to complete discovery.).
477. N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-026F (Court may convene "discovery conference" sua sponte
and must do so on motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of
discovery; attorneys obligated to participate in good faith in framing of discovery plan but only if
a plan is proposed by attorney for any party.); 1-016 (pre-trial conference at court's discretion).
478. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 3226(f) (West 2004) (Court may convene "discovery
conference" sua sponte and must do so on motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan
and schedule of discovery; attorneys obligated to participate in good faith in framing of discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by an attorney for any party.).
479. S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Court may convene "discovery conference" and must do so pursuant
to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; purpose of
discovery conference is to "prevent discovery abuse by encouraging the court to intervene when
abuse occurs, or when an attorney has failed to obtain the cooperation of opposing counsel....
"Routine matters should be resolved by Rule 26(c) Motions for protective orders or Rule 37
Motions to compel.")
480. TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.06 (Court may convene a "discovery conference" and must do so
pursuant to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of discovery.;
26.02(1) (similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), requires court to limit the "frequency or extent of
use" of discovery methods proportional to the needs of the individual case; court may act sua
sponte or pursuant to motion).
481. VT. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Court may convene a "discovery conference" and must do so
pursuant to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of discovery.);
26(b)(1).
482. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(f) (Court may convene a "discovery conference" and must
do so pursuant to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of
discovery).
483. Wyo. R. CIv. P. 26(f) (Court may convene a "discovery conference" and must do so
pursuant to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of discovery).
484. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16(a); CAL. R. CT. 212(b); COLO. R. Civ. P. 16(b);
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(3); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (time limits for discovery set
by court order); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 26(d); HAW. R. Civ. P. 16(b); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(b); ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 218 (mandatory scheduling conference at which court shall consider, inter alia,
"deadlines for the disclosure of witnesses and the completion of written discovery and
depositions"; also provides presumptive discovery completion deadline of sixty days before
commencement of trial); IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.602(2) (scheduling order required on party's
application or court's own motion); ME. R. CIV. P. 16 (standard pre-trial scheduling order
automatically entered by court; includes eight-month discovery completion deadline, subject to
modification by court order); MD. CIRC. CT. R. 2-504(a); MD. CIRC. CT. R 16-202(b) (requires
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and
New
Maryland, 48 8
Illinois, 48 7
California, 48 6
Alaska, 4s5
489
discovery, case management or scheduling
Hampshire -a
conference is also mandatory. In the District of Columbia, a discovery
conference is optional but a scheduling conference is mandatory. 490 In
twelve of the eighteen jurisdictions that mandate scheduling orders493 Hawaii, 494 Idaho, 49 5 Iowa, 496
federal court, 49 1 Colorado, 492 Delaware,
Maine, 497 Michigan, 498 Minnesota, 499 Montana, 50 0 Utah, 5 1 West
Virginia 5 02-a conference dealing with discovery is discretionary with
In seven of these twelve jurisdictions, the discovery
the court.
conference becomes mandatory if requested by a party. 50 3 As
county administrative judge to implement and monitor a case management plan "for prompt and
efficient disposition of actions in the circuit court," including a system of differential case
management"); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.401(b)(2)(a); MINN. R. CIv. P. 16.02 (court shall enter
scheduling order on motion of a party); MONT. R. CIV. P. 26(f); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 62 (mandatory
structuring order to include discovery deadlines); UTAH R. CIv. P. 16(b) (court shall enter
scheduling order on motion of a party); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3).
485. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16(a) (scheduling conference mandatory unless waived by the parties
and judge decides conference unnecessary).
486. CAL. R. CT. 212(b).

487. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (mandatory scheduling conference at which court shall consider,
inter alia, "deadlines for the disclosure of witnesses and the completion of written discovery and
depositions"; also provides presumptive discovery completion deadline of sixty days before
commencement of trial).
488. MD. CIRC. CT. R. 2-504.1(a)(3) (scheduling conference required in specified
circumstances).
489. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 62 (mandatory structuring order to include discovery deadlines).
490. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
491. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
492. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
493. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Cfv. P. 26(f).
494. HAW. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
495. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(b) (court shall consult with attorneys for parties "by a scheduling
conference, telephone, mail or other suitable means.").
496. IOWA R. Civ. P.1.602 (optional pretrial conference), 1.507(1) (optional discovery
conference, but required at party's request).
497. ME. R. CIv. P. 16 (optional trial management conference in cases requiring "special
management").
498. MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.401(a).
499. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06.
500. MONT. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (discovery conference optional but required at party motion), 16(a)
(optional pre-trial conference).
501. UTAH R. Civ. P. 16(b) (optional Scheduling and Case Management Conference).
502. W. VA. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (court may convene a discovery conference and must do so
pursuant to motion if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and schedule of discovery),
16(a) (optional pretrial conference).
503. COLO. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (Case Management Conference required if party files notice to
obtain a disputed Modified Case Management Order); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (discovery
conference required at party's request); HAW. R. CIV. P. 16(f); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06 (same);
MONT. R. CIv. P. 26(); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3) ("If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of
a discovery plan .. . the plaintiff shall, and any party may, move the court for entry of a
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mentioned earlier, Maine 50 4 and Colorado 505 utilize presumptive or
standard discovery orders subject to modification by the parties or the
court in order to conserve judicial resources.
In addition to states that impose presumptive discovery
cut-offs, twelve jurisdictions, including federal, require their courts to
enter scheduling or pre-trial orders that impose limits on discovery
50 6
duration on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, twenty-five jurisdictions-federal, 50 7 Alabama, 508
Alaska, 509 Arizona, 51 0 Delaware, 511 Hawaii, 512 Kansas,513 Maryland, 514
Minnesota, 515 Montana, 5 16 Nevada,517 New Mexico, 518
North
52 2
Carolina, 519 North Dakota, 520 Rhode Island, 52 1 South Carolina,

discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree."); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
(Court must convene discovery conference if motion includes, inter alia, a proposed plan and
schedule of discovery.).
504. ME. R. Civ. P. 16 (standard pre.trial scheduling order automatically entered by court;
includes eight-month discovery completion deadline; subject to modification by court order).
505. COLO. R. CIv. P. 16(b) provides for a Presumptive Case Management Order that lays out
a prescribed pre-trial schedule, including a mandatory "Meet and Confer" during which counsel
discuss, inter alia,whether a Modified Case Management Order is necessary, and that sets forth
deadlines for disclosure, settlement discussions, and discovery (discovery to commence forty-five
days after case is at issue and be completed fifty days before the trial date). Presumptive
discovery limits can be modified for good cause by the entry of a Modified Case Management
Order approved by the court. Id. The parties are entitled to a Case Management Conference to
resolve disagreement about any aspect of the proposed Case Management Order. Id.
506. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 16(a); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 16(b); D.C.
SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 26(d); HAW. R. Civ. P. 16(b); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 16(b); ME. R. CIV.P. 16(a)
("Scheduling Order. After the filing of the answer .... the court shall enter a scheduling order
setting deadlines for the joinder of additional parties, the exchange of expert witness
designations and reports, the scheduling and completion of an alternative dispute resolution
conference ....the completion of discovery, the filing of motions, and the placement of the action
on the trial list.") (emphasis added); MD.CIRC. CT. R. 2.504(a); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.401(b)(2)(a);
MONT. R. Civ. P. 16(b); UTAH R. CiV. P. 16(b); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3).
507. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
508. ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
509. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
510. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
511. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

HAW. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60-226(b)(2).
MD. CIRC. CT. R. 2-402(b).
MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.02(a).
MONT. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
NEV. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
N. M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-026(b)(2).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, R.26(B)(1).
N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

521. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

522. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
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South Dakota, 52 3 Tennessee, 524 Texas, 5 25 Utah, 526 Vermont, 527
Virginia, 528 Washington, 5 29 West Virginia, 530 and Wyoming 53 1-have
proportionality rules that expressly authorize or require courts sua
sponte to customize discovery limits. The proportionality rules in
California 532 and Colorado 533 do not appear to authorize courts to act
sua sponte.
The foregoing survey of state and federal discovery reform
demonstrates that the wide range of diverse combinations of discovery
reforms adopted by the states provides a rich medium for empirical
research. Part V proposes a means to realize the potential for
coordinated and controlled rules experimentation leading to a uniform
state discovery code informed by the collective experience of state
courts.
V. PROPOSAL
This Article proposes a vision of state judicial systems that
collaborate-through a mechanism analogous to the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference-to develop a
national code of state civil procedure based on empirical data
developed through coordinated and controlled experimentation in
state courts. The state civil rules advisory committee could be
established within the framework of the National Center for State
Courts ("NCSC"), reporting its recommendations to the NCSC's
Conference of Chief Justices ("CCJ") in the same way that the federal
civil rules advisory comments reports to the U.S. Judicial Conference.
This proposal addresses the twin defects of existing rule-making
practice previously discussed: (1) the inequities and inefficiencies of
procedural disuniformity throughout the national system of state
courts and (2) the paucity of empirical data to support rules reform.

523. S.D. R. Civ. P. § 15-6-26(b)(1)(a).
524. TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(1).
525. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4.
526. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).

527. VT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
528. VA. SUP. CT. R. CIV. P. 4:1(b)(1).
529. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 26(b)(1).

530.
531.
532.
533.

W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(B).
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE 2017(c).
COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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Unlike the NCCUSL or ALI, which undertake projects that are
relatively limited in scope, 534 the state civil rules advisory committee
would be dedicated exclusively to drafting and amending a
comprehensive code of state civil procedure. Also unlike the NCCUSL
or ALI, the state civil rules advisory committee would be charged with
continuing responsibility to evaluate the efficacy of existing rules and
to coordinate and conduct controlled experiments in participating
state courts designed to improve these rules. The work of the advisory
committee would be supported by a staff of experts in empirical
research, similar to the research support provided by the Federal
Judicial Center to the U.S. Judicial Conference. 53 5 The NCSC
536
currently provides research and consulting services to state courts.
By operating within the framework of the NCSC, the advisory
committee could be established without the necessity of an interstate
compact. 53 7 Rules approved by the Conference of Chief Justices would
534. See supra text accompanying notes 145-160 (outlining some of the proposed rules from
the ALI and NCCUSL).
535. See Letter from Professor Benjamin Kaplan, Harvard Law School, to Dean Acheson
(Mar. 2, 1967) concerning the establishment of a "judicial center" within the Administrative
Office of United States Courts to conduct research and tests in judicial administration: "Under
the terms of the bill, I believe the judicial center could perform effectively notwithstanding the
fact that the deepest and most resistant problems lie on the State rather than on the Federal
level." Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1967 app. (1989).
536. See National Center for State Courts (NCSC), Welcome (serving state courts "[t]hrough
original research consulting services, publications, and national educational programs, NCSC
offers solutions that enhance court operations with the latest technology; collects and interprets
the latest data on court operations nationwide; and provides information on proven 'best
practices' for improving court operations"), at http://www.ncsconline.org/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
537. The ALI considered two consent-based mechanisms to facilitate transfer of litigation
among state courts: an inter-state compact and a uniform act. See COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROJECT, supra note 108, at 16-17 (discussing inter-state compacts in connection with the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act):
Of the many ways to facilitate transfer among state courts, § 4.02 focuses on two
consent-based mechanisms: an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact and a Uniform
Complex Litigation Act.... The Compact Clause of the Constitution provides that
"[nlo State shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power .. " U.S. Const. art. I, § 10,
cl.3. However, the Supreme Court has held that only those compacts that "increase...
political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States" require congressional consent. Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). Section 4.02 suggests consideration of a compact, to be
joined by two or more states. As one model, the Compact could create an Interstate
Complex Litigation Panel composed of state judges from ratifying states. If created,
the Panel might hear petitions for transfer and consolidation of state court complex
cases and determine where, when, and how much of any case to consolidate ....
If the
compact is thought to increase the political power of the states, the requisite
congressional consent could be sought before or after its negotiation.
The second mechanism set out in § 4.02 to foster interstate consolidation is a Uniform
Interstate Transfer and Consolidation Act, which would be similar in structure and function to a
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be recommended to the states for adoption in a fashion similar to the
Uniform Commercial Code.
The NCSC and CCJ, in partnership with the State Justice
Institute (SJI), are logical vehicles to advance this initiative. The
NCSC's mission-"to improve the administration of justice through
leadership and service to state courts" 53 8-is comprehensive enough to
embrace the twin features of my proposal: a collaborative rulemaking
process to fashion uniform state civil procedure rules and controlled
experimentation to empirically inform the rulemaking process. This
mission presupposes the existence of a national state court
community 539 with a shared interest in state civil justice reform and
seeks to serve this common interest, in part, through "reengineering
procedures to ensure that litigants experience an efficient, fair, and
equitable process" 540 and through experimentation 41 conducted by a
5 42
staff of researchers collaborating with court leaders.
The CCJ works in partnership with the NCSC "to provide an
opportunity for consultation among the highest judicial officers of the
several states, commonwealths, and territories, concerning matters of
importance in improving the administration of justice, rules and
compact. However, a uniform act would not require the consent of Congress. The best known
example of a uniform act is the Uniform Commercial Code. In the civil procedure field there is
the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, which deals with jurisdiction and
judicial assistance, and the Uniform Class Action Act, which prescribes uniform rules for state
class actions. See Skirnick & Avery, The State Court Class Action - A Potpourriof Differences, 20
FORUM 750, 759 (1985). Although these have not been widely adopted, they have been used as
models by a number of states.
538. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STRATEGIC PLAN 2002-2004 4 ('The mission of The National
Center for State Courts is to IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE through
LEADERSHIP and SERVICE to state courts, and courts around the world."), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D _About/Images/Strategic%20Plan%202002-2004final.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2004) [hereinafter NCSC STRATEGIC PLAN].
539. Id. ('The National Center will continue to be the premier provider of quality services
meeting the current and future needs of the U.S. state court community, and courts around the
world.").
540. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVE: ADVANCING CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM, at
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:gNQ1L8U-lRkJ:www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/Res
_CtCommCJRIPub.pdf+Civil+Justice+Reform+Initiative&hl=en (last visited May 24, 2005).
541. NCSC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 538, at 4 ('The National Center will.., serve as a
NATIONAL THINK TANK to anticipate new developments, identify best practices, promote
experimentation..."); id. at 11 ("Best practices emerge from a process of continuous
experimentation, innovation, assessment, implementation, and reassessment of court policies,
procedures, and practices.") (emphasis added).
542. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CONFRONTING TODAY'S CHALLENGES: ANNUAL
REPORT 2002 5 (2002) ("NCSC researchers collaborate with court leaders in the federal and state
government to design and implement applied research projects that deal with the expressed
needs
of
state
courts."),
available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Comm/Images/
NCSCAnnlRpt2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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methods of procedure, and the organization and operation of state
courts and judicial systems, and to make recommendations and bring
about improvements on such matters." 543 Like the NCSC, the CCJ
exists "to develop and advance policies in support of common interests
and shared values of state judicial systems. ' 544 As a forum for
consultation among the states' chief judicial officers, the CCJ is an
appropriate vehicle to evaluate uniform rules proposed by an advisory
committee of judges, lawyers and academics. Also, the CCJ's members
are strategically positioned to promote the implementation in their
respective state court systems of uniform rules approved by the CCJ.
Funding could come from a variety of sources. Congress created
the SJI in 1984, with the backing of the CCJ, to fund efforts "to
improve the quality of justice in State courts." 545 SJI funding is
typically matched by state, local and private sources. 54 6
SJI's
exclusive mission to fund state court improvement work as well as its
mandate "to share the success of one State's innovations with every
State court system" 547 make it a potential channel for federal funding
of the uniform rules project.5 48 However, Congress drastically reduced
543.
The purpose of the Conference is to provide an opportunity for consultation among the
highest judicial officers of the several states, commonwealths, and territories,
concerning matters of importance in improving the administrationofjustice, rules and
methods of procedure, and the organization and operation of state courts and judicial
systems, and to make recommendations and bring about improvements on such
matters.
Bylaws of the Conference of Chief Justices, Article II-"Purpose," § 2.1 (1983), available at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.uslbylaws.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005) (emphasis added). The CCJ's mission
is
to improve the administration of justice in the states, commonwealths and territories
of the United States. The conference accomplishes this mission by the effective
mobilization of the collective resources of the highest judicial officers of the states,
commonwealths and territories to, inter alia, develop, exchange, and disseminate
information and knowledge of value to state judicial systems; develop and advance
policies in support of common interests and shared values of state judicial systems.
Conference of Chief Justices, Mission Statement, available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/mission.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
544. Id.
545. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, WHAT IS SJI? (2002), available at http://www.statejustice.
org/pdf/factsht.pdf [hereinafter SJI] (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
546. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, CCJ RESOLUTION 12, COSCA RESOLUTION 4, IN
SUPPORT OF THE STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE (2002), at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/resol12SJI.html (last

visited Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter CCJ RESOLUTION 12].
547. WHAT IS SJI?, supra note 545 ("Only SJI has the authority to assist all State courts ...
and the mandate to share the success of one State's innovations with every State court system as
well as the Federal courts.").
548. The State Justice Institute is a non-profit corporation, established by Congress in 1984:
[T]o award grants to improve the quality of justice in State courts, facilitate better
coordination between State and Federal courts, and foster innovative, efficient
solutions to common problems faced by all courts. Since becoming operation in 1987,
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the SJI's budget which was almost eliminated in 2003.549 Minimal
funding of $3 million was salvaged in fiscal year 2003, largely due to
the efforts of the NCSC and the CCJ who continue to urge Congress to
550
restore the originally authorized funding amount of $25 million.
Congressional awareness of the federal interest in supporting a "fair
and efficient" state court system needs to be raised. 551 Funding for the
uniform rules initiative could also come from state contributions and
private sources including corporations and nonprofit foundations.
Corporations, foundations and law firms currently contribute to the
NCSC 552 and those entities that litigate on a national scale may have
a particular interest in eliminating needless procedural complexity.
The NCSC and CCJ have already taken tentative, but
significant, steps in the direction of developing uniform or model rules.
The NCSC's Civil Justice Reform Initiative ("CJRI"), launched in
2000, is "dedicated to setting an agenda for further reform of the civil
justice system" including civil discovery. 553 The CJRI aims at
achieving "greater predictability and uniformity of procedure." 55 4 The
NCSC's 2002-2004 Strategic Initiative seeks to "improve the
efficiency, effectiveness, and outcomes of the civil justice system" by
promoting uniform procedures including model rules for electronic
555
discovery.
Precedent also exists for a standing rules advisory committee
reporting to the CCJ. In the early 1990s, the CCJ, with the support of
SJI has awarded $120 million to support more than 1,000 projects benefiting the
nation's judicial system and the public it serves.
SJI, at http://www.statejustice.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
549. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 12, POLICY STATEMENTS &
RESOLUTIONS 2, ("[I]n the report on PL 107-77 Congress has stated its intention to terminate
federal funding of SJI at the conclusion of Fiscal Year 2002."), available at http://ccj
.ncsc.dni.us/resoll2SJI.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
550. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES RESOLUTION 16, ("SJI has operated at a funding
level of $3 million in fiscal year 2003 and will continue at the same level in 2003, which has
resulted in a dramatic cutback
in programs."),
available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.
us/resoll6SJIFundinglncrease.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
551. Congress recognized the national interest in improving the "fair and effective
administration of justice" in state courts when it created the SJI to provide federal support and
assistance to State courts. This national interest is based on the premise that state courts
comprise a national state civil justice system that is the "backbone of the American system of
justice." CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 16, available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni/
us/resoll6SJIFundinglncrease.html (last visited March 26, 2005). The national interest in
improving this system is served by "assuring consistency, information-sharing and cooperation
among state judiciaries." CCJ RESOLUTION 12, supra note 546.
552. NCSC, Support the National Center for State Courts, at http://www.ncsconline.
org/D-Dev/Friendsfirst.htm
553. NCSC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 538, at 29.
554. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVE supra note 542.
555. STRATNCSC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 538, at 30.
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the NCSC and the SJI, established the Standing Committee on Mass
Torts "to craft a national approach to dealing with mass tort
litigation." 556 At its 2003 mid-year meeting, the CCJ called for the
establishment of a National Mass Torts Clearinghouse within the
NCSC which would "[d]evelop case management strategies and
techniques, including model rules and standards of practice,....557
To launch the National Clearinghouse, funding was provided by SJI
and sought from business entities, law firms, private nonprofit
5 58
foundations and other interested organizations and associations.
I acknowledge that politics is a formidable obstacle to the
universal adoption of a uniform code of state civil procedure. I also
acknowledge that empirical data can be interpreted to serve political
ends 559 and do not insulate procedural rules from the importuning of
interest groups. Adoption of a uniform code of civil procedure will face
an uphill battle in state legislatures like California's which exercise
the dominant rulemaking power and in which procedure is the
political coin of the realm. However, empirical research by the
Federal Judicial Center has significantly impacted the federal
rulemaking process. 560 Ideally, the successful implementation of the
uniform rules by an expanding core of states-demonstrated by sound
empirical evidence-will create a momentum that will influence
rule-makers in other jurisdictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of a national code of state procedure may seem
utopian. I draw inspiration, however, from the many gifted scholars,
jurists and practitioners who continue to pursue the American Law
Institute's vision of a code of transnational civil procedure applicable
across national boundaries, undeterred by "skeptics who think the
idea premature at best that there can be 'universal' procedural
556. 'The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has made important contributions in the
area of mass torts through its work with the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and with the
support of the State Justice Institute (SJI). In the early 1990s, NCSC helped to develop and
support CCJ's Mass Tort Litigation Committee, a standing committee of 20 state judges
recognized for its efforts to craft a national approach to dealing with mass tort litigation." NAT'L
CENTER. FOR STATE COURTS, NCSC INITIATIVES IN MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORTS, CIVIL ACTION,

3 (, 2003).
557. Id.
558. Id. at 4.

559. See Hensler, supranote 190, at 56 ("It is not uncommon for media and interest groups to
draw inferences regarding a policy question from data gathered to address altogether different
questions.")
560. See Willging, supra note 191, at 1195 ("In general, empirical research appears to have
had a substantial impact on the drafting of amended rules.").
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rules." 561 The drafting and formal approval of these rules by the ALI
and UNIDROIT are the first steps toward the realization of this
vision. 562 So, too, the vision of uniform state rules of civil procedure,
applicable across state boundaries, begins with drafting those rules
and is a worthy endeavor.

561. PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE xv (Council Draft No. 2
2003).
562. The final version of the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure will be
submitted for formal approval by the ALI and UNIDROIT in 2004. PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 10 (Council Draft No. 2 2003).
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